Unveiling The Obigbo Army Killing Fields: 50 Killed, 80 Injured, Scores Disappeared & Hundreds Held In Secrecy - Intersociety

 

…in all, 110 killed & 200 injured by Army and Police in Rivers, Anambra, Imo, Abia, Ebonyi & Enugu via EndSARS

Friday, 6th Nov. 2020 | The Biafra Times

The Int’l Society for Civil Liberties & Rule of Law can circumstantially, verifiably and statistically state that the EndSARS protests in the Igbo States of Rivers (largely Igbo), Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, Abia and Imo were turned into shooting and killing spree by ethno-religiously imbalanced armed soldiers of the Nigerian Army and personnel of the Nigeria Police Force, leading to close range shooting to death of at least 110 unarmed citizens and terminal injuring of at least 200 others.

These, including Gov Wike aided Army massacre in Obigbo and environs, generally took place in 14 days or from 21st Oct to 4th Nov 2020. The killings were so glaring that the corpses of the slain littered inside the bushes and by the roadsides; with some buried shallowly or left to decompose and others picked up by their relatives or emergency officials of some of the affected States especially Rivers and Enugu States. There are also independent reports of scores of bodies of the slain buried atrociously by soldiers in shallow graves including melting them with acid substances. Such was the case in Aba in Feb 2016 and Sept 2017 and Onitsha and Nkpor in May 2016.

While most of the shootings, killings and injuries had occurred between 21st and 24th Oct 2020; a period of three days, in Enugu, Anambra, Ebonyi, Imo and Abia States, those of Obigbo and environs in Rivers State took place between 21st Oct when the Gov Nyesom Wike imposed curfew in Oyigbo Local Government Area, targeting Obigbo and environs and 4th Nov, a period of 14 days, when the curfew supposedly elapsed and the massacre forced to subside following public outcries. Since then, Gov Wike has been running from pillar to pole defending himself, saying he ‘did not invite soldiers to kill Obigbo residents”.

We also wish to state clearly that the 50 death figures and 80 gunshot injuries in Obigbo and environs are most likely to be very conservative. This is going by the fact that pieces of credible information are still filtering in and what we have given here is the general evaluation of what happened. The projected 50 deaths and 80 injuries were temporarily arrived at based on credible information gathered from some of the survivors, who also told us that “they saw soldiers driving away dozens of blindfolded residents of their area (Obigbo and environs) with their hands tied behind their back and taken away half naked in batches of military vehicles”. Intersociety is presently carrying out extensive investigation into the massacre especially with regard to ascertaining the final figure of the dead, the tortured, the sexually harassed including the raped; the burnt, the destroyed, the looted, the arrested and incarcerated and the permanently disappeared.

The number of those blindfolded and made half naked who were independently seen being taking away is estimated at over 200. Our contacts who independently verified from police authorities said police told them that none of them arrested and taken away by soldiers since 21st Oct has been handed over to the Rivers State Police Command as at 4th Nov 2020. This raises serious suspicion of secret killing of scores of them by soldiers and possible decimation of their bodies with acid substances for purpose of erasing traces. We also seriously suspect that those arrested since two weeks and possibly held illegally in secret Army custodies are most likely to be undergoing outlawed and agonizing detention practices.

Therefore, as statistics conscious rights group, Intersociety has refused to speak categorically on Obigbo massacre until pieces of reliable statistics or information are gathered. That is to say that this position of ours on the number of the slain and the maimed arising from the massacre is not final, but a credible attempt to present the thirsty global community with a general statistical idea of what the ethno-religiously lopsided Nigerian Army did to Christian citizens of old Eastern Nigeria in Obigbo and environs, in full conspiracy of Gov Nyesom Wike.

We are also in possession of dozens of photos and videos of the slain and the maimed, collected from Rivers, Anambra, Ebonyi, Imo, Enugu and Abia States. Apart from getting them from direct source, they have also been manually and forensically investigated. The photos and videos, many of which not public image friendly, except on personal or formal request, clearly depict deadly use of force by the culpable soldiers and police personnel particularly in Obigbo and environs where ‘heavy’ military bullets were used against unarmed and defenseless citizens.

The victims were also targeted and shot at close range and forbidden or sensitive parts of their bodies; all with intent to massacre or slay.  That is to say that the slain victims seen and verified were shot at close range and their sensitive parts including forehead/brain, chest/heart, abdomen/manhood, stomach, and eyes/nose/mouth regions. For instance, Intersociety agrees with Gov Nyesom Wike, to an extent, that “some photos and videos being flooded in the social media as those linked to Obigbo massacre are fake or not connected with same”, but not all of them are fake or with different origins.

Gov Wike’s position on this has implied that ‘soldiers and proscribed SARS operatives did not kill  defenseless residents of Obigbo and environs, or destroy and burn properties including residences, or sexually harass including engaging in forced sexual intercourse with or raping unmarried/young married women, or carry out general acts of torture, or blindfold some defenseless residents, take them to unknown military destinations and possibly kill them, or engage in mass arrest of hundreds of the residents of the area; etc. Contrarily, reverse is the case.

Obigbo Casualties & Injuries: Therefore, in Obigbo and environs in Rivers State, we can temporarily confirm the killing of at least 50 unarmed citizens and injuring of not less than 80 others. We can also confirm eleven deaths so far out of which, eight has their names identified and three yet to be named. Their names are: (1) Pastor Igwe (slain husband of Mrs. Amara Igwe), (2) Queen Nwazuo (slain fiancée of Mr. Monday Bakor), (3) Okoro Peter and (4) Chinwendu O.: they were shot at close range and killed instantly by soldiers on 24th Oct 2020 few meters away from Gov Wike’s convoy.

The Gov was visiting Obigbo to assess his military deployment and curfew same day and the two young residents barely emerged from their houses to hear what their Gov has come to tell them when soldiers sighted them and opened fire, killing them instantly. They were shot at forehead, forcing the brain-box of Late Chinwendu to bust and emptied at the center of the road. Other dead citizens were: (5) Jude Egejuru (died from gunshot injuries), (6) Clifford Nkemdilim, (7) Late Miss Ngozi Ozuo, (8) Udeme Ossy Monday, (9) a yet-to-be identified dead citizen, (10) second yet-to-be-identified citizen and (11) third yet-to-be-identified dead citizen. It must be noted that soldiers took away bodies of most of those killed.

Among the deadly injured are: (1)  Chukwuma Chinonso, (2) Nwoke Okwudiri Nwonye, (3) Uche Ogbonna, (4) Chikaodi Agwu, (5) Michael Okwudiri, (6) John Emeka, (7) Agwu Enyi, (8) Obichukwu Chibuike, (9) Izuchukwu Igwe, (10) Eluu Chukwuemeka, (11) Arinze Joshua, (12) Nwakama Izuegbe, (13) Destiny Okorie, (14) Michael Nkama, (15) Israel Asoh, (16) Emeka Heart, (17) Victor Heart, (18) Orji Amaoji, (19) Paschal, (20) Obasi Emela, (21) Chiwuzu Orjinta and (22) Sylvester Odoche.

Casualties & Injuries Across The Southeast: In Ebonyi State, where at least ten citizens were killed, among them were: (1) Nwibo Chibueze, (2) Nwali Emeka, (3) a yet-to-be-identified young man in his twenties and (4) Ofoke Sunday. Among at least 30 victims of gunshot wounds in the State are: Oshopo Chinedu, (2) Ngoke The, (3) Nwoji Ikechukwu, (4) Nwovu Ikechukwu, (5) Nwofe Lewis, (6) Elom Chimezie, (7) Opoke Mbakwe, (8) Onwe Monday, (9) Elochukwu Suday, (10) Onwe Ezekiel, (11) Igwe Uchenna, (12) Nwudele Uchenna, (13) Nwudele Uchenna, (14) Nwamiri Chukwudi, (15)  Nwebi Stephen, (16) Nwofoke Ugochukwu, (17) Nwoke Peter, (18) Mbam Emmanuel, (19) Okey Emeka, (20)Egba Izuchukwu, (21) Awoke Nnamdi and (22) Alo Peter.

In Enugu State, where at least ten citizens were killed, among them were: (1) Christian Ugwuaja, (2) Sunday Chime, (3) Victor Igwe and (4) John Ikemuefuna. Among at least 30 gunshot victims are: (1) Okafor Kosisochukwu, (2) Ezeagbo Ifeanyi, (3) Odigomma Chimazom, (4) Ajah Chukwuemeka, (5) Somtoo Nwaeze, (6) Innocent Ominyi, (7) Friday Mgebebu, (8) Ezinduamaka Osondu, (9) Happiness Chidiebere, (10) Chinonso Obodoagu, (11) Idoko Ebuka, (12) Ibebuike Uzoigwe, (13) Chidi Oguejiofor, (14) Odinaka Ejim, (15) Solomon Okafor, (16) Ani Ifedibalachukwu, (17) Ituma Tochukwu, (18) Oge Simon, (19) Ezeaga Chukwuma, (20) Onwuna Kosiso, (21) Onwe Humphrey, (22) Sunday Kingsley Nweze and (22) Akpataobi Peter.

In Anambra State, where at least ten unarmed citizens were killed, among them were: (1) Ezenwile Okwuchukwu John, (2) Obasi Mmaduabuchi, (3) Nwafor Ikechukwu and (4) Ekeh Emmanuel Friday; and among 20 wounded citizens are: (1) Okafor Chidi, (2) Ogbada Chinonso, (3) Chigozie Ezenwa, (4) Nwokwu Anayochukwu and (5) Onuoha Kalu. In Abia State, where up to, if not over 20 citizens were killed, among them were: (1) Ifeanyi Nwaogu, (2) Isaiah Chiedozie, (3) Chijoke, (4) Chinedu, (5) Kelechi Godslove, (6) Uche (killed at Ogbohill, Aba), (7) Gorge (killed along Cameroon Road, Aba) and (8) Chukwuka Odinaka Omemma; and among some 25 gunshot injured citizens are: (1) Cyprian Onwe, (2) Uchenna Kalu, (3) Nze Anayo Okoro, (4) Enyinnaya Agha and (5) Chinomso Nkalu. In Imo State, ten persons were killed in Mbaitolu and Orlu and about 15 others shot and injured. Among the dead were Late Mr. Agomuo of IMSUBEB (killed by Army at Nworie-Ubi, Owerri) and Mr. Uwadi Ebuzoeme shot dead in Orlu.    

Signed:

Principal Officers: Emeka Umeagbalasi (Board Chair), Chinwe Umeche, Esq., (Head of Democracy), Obianuju Igboeli, Esq., (Head of Civil Liberties), Ndidiamaka Bernard, Esq., (Head of Int’l Justice & Human Rights) and Comrade Sam Kamanyaoku (Head of Field Data Collection & Documentation)

Contacts:

Mobile/WhatsApp: +2348174090052

Source: Intersociety

Nigeria: Janjaweed Massive Migration to the Southeast Quite Worrisome

By Princewill Akubumma | Biafra Writers

May 27, 2020

Proactively speaking, we must as a matter of urgency eschew political correctness and call a spade by its name. We must put on our thinking cap to be able to analyse this influx of able bodied young men into our territory at this particular point in time when the federal government imposed lockdown and restricted movement from one state to the other.

In order to constructively engage some arguments rising from various quarters in the country, some of which try to draw strength from right of movement, one must ask “why must it be at this critical moment when movement from place to place is banned?” The very fact that this migration usually takes place in the midnight should be another big concern to any right thinking human, especially those from the eastern enclave of the country.

Some factors influence massive migration. Such factors include job availability, infrastructure, human capital development, and war in the migrants’ home. But there are no jobs in the eastern states, no infrastructure, no human capital development, and of course, no war in the North from which the migrants troop in. Even the insurgency over there is a politico-religious creation aimed at conquering the rest of the nations roped in this failed British experiment mistaken for a country.

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More worrisome is the fact that this massive migration of young Jihadists is happening almost immediately Boko Haram is dislodged in neighbouring Chad, Niger, and the Cameroon. It seems to me therefore that a grand plan is underway to invade the East and we should as a matter of urgency rise against it. A stitch in time, they say, saves nine.

To this end, every community leader and president general of various organizational bodies in our land must set up a Neighbourhood Watch, and in places where it already exists, beef it up. Intelligence units are also advisable, for as an Igbo adage has it, onye ndi iro gbara gburugburu n'eche ndu ya nche mgbe nile; that is, he that is surrounded by the enemies keeps watch over his life at all time.


The Biafra Times
Edited by Nelson Ofokar Yagazie
Publisher: Chijindu Benjamin Ukah
Contact us: [email protected]

Regional Policing: Nigeria Heading the Way of Yugoslavia, Southeast Least Prepared

February 6, 2020

Princewill Akubumma | For Biafra Writers

Yugoslavia, before its disintegration, practiced a mixture of socialism and federalism. Of all the nations lumped together in that one state, the Serbs – just like the Nigerian Fulanis – dominated every sector of the government and the army. They oppressed other regions and tried to keep them from seceding. Yet a time came when Slovenia and Croatia, having had enough, opted out.

The Serbs, dominant of the state, tried to stop them, but the seceding duo pushed on with referendum after which arms struggle became inevitable. Blood was shed, souls were lost, yet both Slovenia and Croatia achieved independence, leading to a total disintegration of Yugoslavia and the emergence of eight separate states.

A cross-examination of the situation in the Nigerian state today will show that the Zoo mistaken for a country is headed the way of Yugoslavia. The incessant killings by the Islamic foot soldiers in the guise of Fulani herdsmen, the unprecedented procurement of arms by Miyetti Alla, the Fulanization of the army and every other government sector, are all a replica of the Serbian attitude which plunged Yugoslavia into a disaster from which it never recovered.

READ ALSO: Call for Buhari to Resign, Abaribe Spoke the Mind of the People

The western part of the country – the Yoruba – has already floated its own security arm – the Amotekun. There’s no gainsaying that Amotekun is a reaction to the insecurity in the country created by the dominant and subjugating Fulani Islamic fundamentalists. Amotekun is a Yoruba army in disguise. The west knows what is to come and unlike the insensitive subservient lots in the East masquerading as Igbo leaders, they don’t want to be taken aback.

The failed British experiment called Nigeria is made up of three regions – North, East and West. The North is the aggressor, the West by way of floating Amotekun seems prepared, but the East? Just like the people of Bosnia in disintegrated Yugoslavia, the East, rather than equip self against the coming tempest, deludes self with political correctness and phantom peace.

READ ALSO: Nigeria made Africa a Pawn in the World

The East either purges self of the docile pathogens or suffers the fate of Bosnia – the worst affected region of the Yugoslavian conflict. The line of division between the riverine area and the hinterland as drawn by the Nigerian government in connivance with the British must be quickly erased and the people united to form a common front capable of rebuffing the northern aggression. A stitch in time, they say, saves nine.

The Biafra Times

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Edited By Nelson Ofokar Yagazie

Publisher: Charles Opanwa

The Bait of 2023 Presidency

APC National Leader, Asiwaju Bola Tinubu visits President Muhammadu Buhari at State House, Abuja.

January 20, 2020

By Eluwa Chidiebere Chinazu  | Biafra Writers

Recently, the social media has been awash with headlines bothering on the supposed tribe to produce the president come 2023 general elections in Nigeria. The north, understanding that both the East and the West are politically naïve, now uses the presidential seat as bait for the two sides.

While the North prides self as the giver (not forgetting the claim that they are born-to-rule), the Southeast and Southwest shamelessly beg to receive. The question of who owns Nigeria is thus elaborately answered. The North gets what they want not by begging but by declaration. Only the North does that.

The recent statement by the president about having no intention to run for a third term should be understood. A president who is serving out his second tenure making such utterance is quite significant. The statement, if properly analyzed, is suggestive of the fact that the North is not ready to abdicate the office of the presidency to either of the divides at the Southern hemisphere.

Recent events have shown that the North is using the presidency as bait to both Southeast and Southwest. What then could be their motive? What does the North stand to achieve in making the East and the West fight each other over the 2023 presidential slot?

RELATED NEWS: Biafra: Igbo Presidency, a Misplaced Priority

If the North succeeds in causing a serious rift between the two sides, many gains can be harvested from the conflict. One of such gains is the continuation of President Muhammadu Buhari in office. Secondly, the Southeast and Southwest can be presented to the world as incompetent people that shouldn’t near the seat of presidency in Nigeria. With that, the born to rule mentality that has been nursed in the mind of every Northerner will become established.

When one looks at this from the direction of conquest, it makes more sense. The North understands that embarking on conquest of these areas without first causing the two sides to fight each other will spell doom for them. There's no gain attached to any region becoming the president of the country. Presidency is beneficial to only the North because the North owns the country as made possible by the colonial masters.

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Edited By Nelson Ofokar Yagazie

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Biafra: Current developments make Biafra inevitable - South-East, South-South monarchs

December 26, 2019 | The Biafra Times

By Sunday Nwakanma

Umuahia - Traditional rulers from the South-East and the South-South geopolitical zones have said current developments in Nigeria have made Biafra an inevitable option for the people of the zones.

The monarchs said this when they visited the Afaraukwu Umuahia country home of the leader of the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra, Nnamdi Kanu, to condole with the family over the death of Kanu’s parents.

According to the monarchs, the people of the South-East and South-South have been made the targets and victims of bad government’s policies and misrule.


While pledging their support for the struggles towards the actualisation of the sovereign state of Biafra, the monarchs called on the people of the zones to join the struggle, saying Nigeria no longer held the hope for anyone from the eastern region.

They particularly urged the political elite to stop attacking Kanu but synergise with him towards the peaceful restoration of Biafra, pointing out that restoration of Biafra did not require another war but sustained peaceful agitation and unity of purpose.

READ ALSO: Nigeria: Over 1,000 Christians killed by Islamic militants in Nigeria in 2019: report

The monarchs appealed to the United Nations, the United States and the international community to prevail on Nigerian leaders to stop the wickedness perpetrated against the people of the region by the cabal at the centre.

Spokesman for the monarchs, Gideon Ejike, said every prediction by Kanu about Nigeria had come to reality, thus confirming that Nigeria had no plans but perpetual enslavement of the regions.

Eze Ifeanyichukwu Okeke of Ekwulobia in Anambra State said, “Nigeria has expired and can no longer bind together as a united entity.”


The king of Alumili, the Ohazurumee VIII, HRM Onyenweal Igwuocha, condemned the Federal Government for treating the people of the old Eastern Region, particularly Ndigbo, as conquered slaves.

He said, “We are here today to tell the nation that what we need is our nation because the nation is already before us. We are not Hausa, we are not Arewa, not Oduduwa and we cannot be them.

READ ALSO: Oraifite Mayhem: Restrain and refrain from arresting Barr. Ifeanyi Ejiofor, Federal High Court ordered Nigerian security agencies

“So, you don’t force water and oil to be together. We cannot be together. So, I want the whole world and all the world power to listen and hear us.

“We can’t live together. We have been living for over 500 years and that is the reason the Ezes, the real owners of Biafra, land have stood up and said enough is enough! This thing has to stop and what we need is Biafra!”

The Public Relations Officer of the Council of Ndi Eze in Biafraland, HRM Eze Nnamdi Ochor, praised Kanu for his uncommon sacrifices towards the restoration of Biafra, which, according to him, are the reasons he lost both parents at the same time.

He added that Kanu’s highwire international diplomatic consultations and other strategic efforts would make Biafra restoration a reality sooner than expected

The Biafra Times

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West Africa: The Risk of Jihadist Contagion in West Africa

December 23, 2019 | The Biafra Times

By International Crisis Group

Faced with jihadist breakthrough in Burkina Faso, neighbouring states in West Africa's Gulf of Guinea increasingly fear attacks in their own territories. These countries should improve intelligence sharing, strengthen border controls and regain the trust of local populations.

What's new? Islamist militants' lengthening reach in the Sahel, particularly in Burkina Faso, is a growing concern for coastal West African states. These states' leaders fear that militants could use Burkina as a launching pad for operations further south.

Why does it matter? Militant attacks could threaten coastal states' stability. Some of these states have weak spots similar to those that jihadists have exploited in the Sahel, notably neglected peripheries that resent central authority. Several will hold what promise to be contentious elections in 2020, distracting leaders from tackling the threat.

What should be done? The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is lobbying for joint military operations involving regional states. But intelligence sharing, border controls and efforts to win over local populations would be cheaper and more effective. ECOWAS should redouble efforts to avert electoral crises that militants could use to their advantage.



I. Overview

In West Africa, jihadist movements are spreading like the desert, from north to south. Their influence in Burkina Faso is a growing concern for West Africa's coastal states. Though these states have suffered very few attacks, their leaders fear that militants will use Burkina as a launching pad for operations further south. The subregional organisation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is lobbying for large-scale military operations in response.

Yet such operations could prove a blunt instrument in a situation that requires surgical tools; they may aggravate tensions among ethnic groups in vulnerable areas. Instead, coastal states should adopt measures that are less expensive and likely to be more effective: better intelligence gathering and sharing, better border controls, targeted arrests and repaired relations with populations in neglected northern areas. ECOWAS should also take steps to minimise risks that elections in several coastal states do not provoke crises that would distract from efforts to rein in jihadists.



The spectre of jihadism reaching toward the Gulf of Guinea haunts West Africa. Islamist militancy's growth in an increasing unstable Burkina Faso has greatly heightened this concern. Burkina occupies a critical position, linking the Sahel to coastal states and bordering four of them: Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo. Burkina's history, society, economy and politics are interwoven with those of its southern neighbours. It could serve as an open door to the Gulf of Guinea. With militants sinking roots in Burkina, they would occupy an ideal position for moving south.

Jihadists themselves have repeatedly affirmed their intention to expand into coastal West Africa. True, their ability to do so in the immediate future is unclear: they have yet to carry out attacks in any coastal country's north and, in the south, they have struck only one, Côte d'Ivoire in March 2016. But militants often act more out of opportunism, exploiting turmoil, than sophisticated strategy. They could draw strength from coastal states' own fragility.

In that light, the weaknesses Gulf of Guinea countries display, which often mirror those of their northern neighbours, are all the more troubling. Though richer than the Sahelian states, they are plagued by the same underdevelopment of peripheries remote from the seat of power, popular disenchantment with absent or brutal state authorities, and shortcomings in intelligence and security services. Several Gulf of Guinea countries will hold what appear set to be contentious elections in 2020, meaning the threat of violent political infighting looms. Presidential polls in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Togo could be particularly polarising and dangerous.

Another reason for the region's fragility lies in states' inability to work together. They have struggled to develop a united response to the jihadist threat. The creation of several different structures with overlapping security and development mandates has meant that efforts have been scattershot. ECOWAS is now attempting to coordinate, impose some order and mount joint military operations among its member states. But the subregional group lacks leadership and the billion dollars that joint operations require and that ECOWAS hopes will be supplied by West African states themselves appears unlikely to materialise, given the economic difficulties those states face.

There is a better and less costly option. Instead of stepping up military operations, coastal states should focus on sharing intelligence and strengthening border controls. They should make extra effort to regain the trust of local populations to slow down jihadist infiltration in their northern regions. Given the nature of the threat today, authorities in the region should focus on targeted missions based on reliable information, rather than large-scale operations that may result in the mistreatment of civilians, particularly among populations that are accused of being close to jihadists. Critical, too, is that ECOWAS and its foreign partners, notably the EU and France, step up diplomatic efforts to avert brewing electoral crises that could turn violent, threaten those countries' stability as much as jihadists do and create opportunities militants might exploit.

II. The Burkinabé Door

The Sahelian crisis has spread to Burkina Faso. Some jihadist groups appeared in northern Mali in 2012, and quickly spread to central Mali and the border between Mali and Niger. Since summer 2015, hundreds of attacks by jihadist and other armed groups, including self-defence militias, have occurred in Burkina Faso.

The spread of the Sahelian crisis into Burkina Faso may lead to violence on a regional scale, as it aids the progress of armed groups toward the coastal south. Geographically, Burkina Faso occupies a central position in West Africa. Sharing borders with Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin and Togo, the country sits at the junction of the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. Its relationship with its four southern neighbours is steeped in history, demography, economics and politics. Burkina and the coastal countries also have religious ties: as in many coastal states, a significant proportion of Burkinabé are Christian or animist, something unique in the Sahel, where the overwhelming majority of the population professes the Muslim faith. Burkina Faso therefore serves as an open door to the Gulf of Guinea.

By establishing themselves in Burkina Faso, jihadist groups can acquire a perfect launching pad for operations in the coastal south; they can benefit from the support of dense and longstanding community, religious, road, trade and criminal networks. For instance, Burkina Faso's numerous artisanal gold mines are a potential source of funding for armed jihadist groups. These mines' profitability is connected to coastal countries, because most of the gold is traded there. And from the supply sheds of these countries' artisanal and industrial gold mines, jihadist groups can obtain detonators for their home-made bombs.

Since the beginning of 2019, most incidents occurring at the borders of coastal countries, and involving jihadist armed groups either directly or indirectly, have been linked to Burkina Faso. Two French tourists kidnapped in Benin on 1 May, likely by bandits who allegedly tried to sell them to jihadist groups, were freed a few days later in northern Burkina Faso. In late April, Togo's President Faure Gnassingbé announced the arrest of suspected members of armed groups coming from the country's neighbour to the north. That same month, Burkinabé intelligence services warned their colleagues in neighbouring states that several armed jihadists had left the country to take refuge in Benin and Ghana. A few days later, Benin launched the Djidjoho military operation on its border with Burkina Faso. Koury, a Malian town near the border with Burkina Faso, where unidentified individuals attacked a border checkpoint and killed seven people on 19 May, is an important crossing point on the way to the country's second-largest city, Bobo-Dioulasso.

Burkina Faso is not the only possible entry point for groups seeking to extend their influence into West Africa. Several incidents have occurred on the border between Mali and Côte d'Ivoire, including the abduction of a Colombian nun in the Sikasso region in February 2017. In recent months, the jihadist group Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) appears to be trying to open a corridor from northern Mali to north-western Nigeria and northern Benin, passing through the Nigerian town of Dogondoutchi. For its part, the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), an offshoot of Boko Haram, is hoping to benefit from the chaos caused by an unprecedented crime wave in the Nigerian state of Zamfara, on the border with Niger, to sell weapons and help its members gain access to south-western Niger.

At present, jihadist groups seem to be advancing toward the south and east of Burkina Faso, approaching the Gulf of Guinea states. On 7 November 2019, an attack on a convoy of workers from the Boungou gold mine, which killed at least 38 people, confirmed their presence in the east of the country, bordering Benin and Togo. This attack occurred in spite of the Otapuanu military operation, which was launched on 7 March 2019 and which authorities had hailed as a success. It has heightened the concerns of mining companies, showing that armed groups were active in an area close to their sites, particularly in northern Ghana. Bringing further legitimacy to these concerns, Burkinabé security forces recently intervened in the region of Pô, a town bordering Ghana in the south east of the country, killing six individuals suspected of terrorism.

Burkina Faso's stability does not depend solely on the security of regions like the north and east, where armed groups are present. In a country where popular insurrections have led the head of state to resign not once but twice, in 1966 and 2014, social tensions resulting from poor living conditions pose a real threat to the leadership elected in 2015. As well as contributing to the efficiency of Burkina Faso's security apparatus, the country's partners should help defuse public anger by financially supporting the government of President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, but also by facilitating dialogue between it and the opposition and civil society.

Partner countries, along with regional and international institutions, should also pay close attention to the political fragility of Burkina Faso. The presidential election scheduled for 2020 is crucial for the country, but there is no guarantee that it will pass off peacefully. For the first time in decades, there will be an open ballot with an uncertain outcome. The sense of unfettered competition is whetting politicians' appetites. In a country where jihadist and self-defence groups are both active, and civilian volunteers are engaged alongside the regular armed forces, any of the candidates could be tempted to use force against his opponents. Finally, for the first time in Burkina's history, the diaspora, which includes several million people living in nearby countries, will be able to vote. Emigrés could well determine the election result. Their votes must be accurately counted in order to avoid disputes. In other words, other coastal countries, notably Côte d'Ivoire, will also need to prepare for the Burkinabé election.

Burkina Faso cannot afford a new political crisis or period of transition like that which followed the departure of President Blaise Compaoré in 2014. The actors in this transition used the army for political ends, to advance or defend their own interests, diverting it from its main mission of territorial defence. A new phase of political instability marked by the absence of a strong, legitimate executive would produce similar results, further damaging the security forces' capacity to fight armed groups. As such, the wider the "Burkinabé door" opens, the greater the risk that the central Sahel's violence will become a broader regional phenomenon. The coming months are crucial for both the country and the region. Under pressure from both jihadists and an institutional crisis, the Burkinabé state would likely crumble, losing its ability to stop militant groups from spreading southward.

III. Jihadist Ambitions for Expansion in the Gulf of Guinea

For the past several years, armed groups active in the Sahel have referred in their declarations to the destabilisation of countries in the Gulf of Guinea. In a video dated 8 November 2018, three leaders of the Group to Support Islam and Muslims (GSIM) - Iyad Ag Ghali, Djamel Okacha and Amadou Koufa - a coalition of jihadist groups created in 2017 and affiliated with al-Qaeda, called on the Fulani people dispersed across the Sahel and West Africa to "pursue jihad" in other countries, notably citing Senegal, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Cameroon.

As yet, no al-Qaeda or ISIS figure has announced a detailed plan to destabilise Burkina Faso and turn it into jihadist corridor leading to coastal countries, although several incidents suggest collaboration between different jihadist armed groups on Burkinabé soil. In 2014 and 2015, unidentified combatants coming from Mali reportedly carried out reconnaissance operations in Benin and Burkina Faso, in the W National Park, not far from the Pendjari National Park where two French tourists were kidnapped and their Beninese guide killed last May. Arrested in April 2019 in Burkina Faso, Oumarou Diallo, the commander of a local jihadist group known as the Diawo Group, had a list of contacts in Benin, Togo and Ghana, demonstrating links with these countries. Several analysts interpret this collaboration as the sign of a joint project that seeks to bring about Burkina Faso's collapse so as to open a passage into Togo, Benin, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.

For these groups, there are many advantages to opening new southern fronts in the coastal countries' northern regions. As an extension of the Sahel, these border areas have practical benefits, serving as a rear base for rest and logistics. Crisis Group has received reports from several sources that armed militants from Burkina Faso are moving regularly along the Ghanaian and Togolese borders, on their way to "rest areas" in these countries.

As jihadist groups spread their attacks across a wider geographic area, they hinder the campaigns of regional and international forces by obliging them to disperse. The militants adopted this decentralisation strategy in 2013, when the French Operation Serval drove them out of towns they were occupying in Mali. They have since sought to take over rural areas abandoned by the state and weakened by local tensions, in particular along borders. The push toward the Gulf of Guinea seems to be a continuation of this trend toward dispersal of the enemy, while putting pressure on fragile border areas.

Finally, with a foothold in the coastal countries' northern areas, the region's jihadist groups could establish way stations allowing them to get closer to prime targets in the major coastal cities. Another feat like the March 2016 attack on the Ivorian seaside town of Grand-Bassam would heighten the unrest that the jihadists crave; it would also effectively punish countries like Togo and Côte d'Ivoire for their participation in the UN's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Ivorian authorities, with the help of French intelligence services, reportedly thwarted several attacks in Abidjan last May. Obtaining this foothold would allow jihadist groups to extend the corridor stretching from northern Mali to north-western Nigeria and northern Benin.

IV. The Shared Weaknesses of the Central Sahel and Gulf of Guinea

It is difficult to predict which Gulf of Guinea countries are most likely to be infected by the jihadist contagion in the months or years to come. This vast area includes not only Burkina Faso's immediate neighbours, but also Guinea, which for the moment seems impervious to jihadist attacks, and even Senegal, which has strengthened security at its borders in recent years, notably to avoid an attack in its capital, Dakar.

With the exception of Côte d'Ivoire, events in the northern regions of the coastal countries bordering Burkina Faso are little known. The north of Benin, Togo and Ghana has, until recently, remained on the periphery of researchers' concerns, at least from a security perspective. This area was spared the major West African crises of recent decades, including the Mano River wars and the first years of the Sahelian crisis.

In addition, there is no obvious shared weakness that armed groups could exploit. These countries' northern regions are made up of territories that are highly heterogeneous in terms of demography, politics and economics. In this area, stretching for hundreds of kilometres, local dynamics will determine where communal tensions and frustrations will continue to simmer, and where they will boil over into violent movements, led either by jihadists or other armed groups. Similarly, each country's religious realities are complex. It is too simplistic to view the coastal countries as structured around a Muslim north and a Christian south. Such a picture takes no account of the mass migration from north to south, the high incidence of mixed marriage - which has increased with urbanisation - or the large numbers of animists.

A trend has been emerging in recent years, however: the gap is widening between these northern areas and the central state, while the southern coastline attracts the bulk of investment contributing to economic development and modernisation.

Ghana provides a clear example. Here, roughly one quarter of the population lives below the poverty line. Yet 70 per cent of people in the north are afflicted by poverty, despite the Ghanaian state's efforts in the 2000s, notably to provide health care and other infrastructure in Tamélé and its surroundings. According to the World Bank, the situation is similar in Côte d'Ivoire, where "the northern and north-western regions of the country have higher poverty rates (over 60 per cent) than coastal areas and the south-western region (under 40 per cent)".

READ ALSO: Nigeria: The New War Against Africa’s Christians

Alarmingly, countries in the Gulf of Guinea have neglected outlying zones in proximity to the turbulent Sahel. In the central Sahel, this lack of state control is a major cause of the increased violence in certain peripheries. Similar to what is happening across the border in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, many people in northern parts of the Gulf of Guinea countries are also facing difficulties with access to natural resources, leading to clashes between farmers and herders, which have contributed heavily to the escalation in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso.

Political solutions are urgently needed to lower the risk of armed conflict in the coastal countries' remote northern regions. Governments in the Gulf of Guinea should no longer link public spending to the electoral strategy of investing mainly in areas with the most voters or which support the ruling party. International partners must ditch the development dogma of placing infrastructure in the most densely populated areas as a way of maximising the return on investment.

Gauging the jihadist threat is by no means straightforward. Within the space of a few months, countries in the Gulf of Guinea and their partners have shifted from a sense of unease to a state of alert. A French army reconnaissance mission in northern Benin indicated some concern already in April 2019. In July, the French army's chief of the defence staff, François Lecointre, replied to the question, "is there a risk that the jihadist movement could pose a threat to neighbouring West Africa?" by saying, "we're not there yet". Just a few months later, in late November, he remarked that the French army was seeking to "prevent this [jihadist] hydra from continuing to expand into other West African countries". The spiralling violence in Burkina Faso has been instrumental in spreading this perception of insecurity.

The proceeds that various West and Central African countries derive from counter-terrorist activities have encouraged some of them to overstate a threat whose actual extent is sometimes debatable. No armed jihadist group has yet attacked the north of a country in the Gulf of Guinea. Jihadists have been blamed for many attacks on these countries' borders, yet none have claimed responsibility themselves.

A high-profile example was the killing of a Spanish priest and four Burkinabé customs officials on 15 February 2019 near Burkina Faso's border with Togo. The abduction of two French citizens in W National Park in Benin, in May 2019, was allegedly carried out by bandits who then tried to sell them to the ISGS or to Katiba Macina, a militant group based in central Mali. Although the jihadist forces' involvement seems indirect, this incident has still stoked fears in West African countries and among their partners, reinforcing the idea that the regional security apparatus in place at the time of these events was not fit for purpose and needs rethinking.

V. The Elusive Regional Response

Since it fails to include all West African nations, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad) appears to be an inadequate response to the regional contagion of jihadist violence. The G5 Sahel is based on the idea that the jihadist threat would expand horizontally, crossing the western Sahel from east to west; the force's designers ignored the possibility of vertical expansion, despite warnings from many quarters. As early as 2017, an ECOWAS senior official expressed concerns about deficiencies in the G5 Sahel's security measures, predicting attacks on coastal countries, particularly Benin.

The G5 and other West African countries have never properly joined forces. Detractors point to how the G5 artificially divides West Africa into two distinct spaces, ignoring the human and political ties between the northern and southern countries. The labelling of a Sahel region limited to four Francophone countries and Mauritania has also caused rifts in the region, reigniting old rivalries between Francophones and Anglophones, and rousing suspicions of French neo-colonial ambitions. Ivorian president Alassane Ouattara, patriarch of West Africa and undoubtedly France's most loyal ally in the region, highlighted the G5 Sahel's limitations last June: "MINUSMA and the G5 Sahel aren't enough on their own. We must find ways to coordinate more broadly and more effectively in order to help these neighbouring countries combat terrorism".

Over the coming months, ECOWAS will assess the possibility of greater coordination. During the extraordinary session of the summit for heads of state and government held in Ouagadougou on 14 September, the sub-regional organisation adopted an action plan to coordinate and improve the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts, and committed itself, along with its member states, to raising $1 million between 2020 and 2024.

This task is divided among various organisations, and three in particular: the G5; the multinational force comprising Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger in the fight against Boko Haram; and the Accra Initiative, a cooperative venture of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo that targets organised crime and "violent extremism" in the border regions of member countries.

ECOWAS is the best-placed organisation to coordinate efforts to combat jihadist violence across the region, being the only forum where the leaders of its member states can regularly meet to reach agreements and seek common ground. Most countries in the region have a presidential system and their heads of state enjoy far-reaching powers, a crucial asset when it comes to decision-making.

Regrettably, like the G5, ECOWAS is hampered by a lack of vision, and no president of its member countries has been able to provide clear leadership. The organisation has trouble speaking with one voice on important peace and security issues. Its recent promise in Ouagadougou to coordinate counter-terrorism activities is likely to founder without stronger and broader regional cooperation on the ground, encompassing issues of collective security. As the regional economic and demographic powerhouse, Nigeria should be the country to play this role. It is enmeshed in domestic problems, however, and sometimes finds itself at loggerheads with ECOWAS. Nigeria should prioritise regaining its influence over the region and take the lead.

The most encouraging aspect of the action plan presented in Ouagadougou is the aim to self-finance counter-terrorism activities from 2020 to 2024. The G5 has shown how financial dependence can become paralysing. Its armed forces have been hindered by financial difficulties from the outset, a problem compounded by the group's lack of control over its own budget: its external funding depends on pledges, or else backers manage its resources instead of the member states themselves.

But the million-dollar budget announced by ECOWAS will be hard to raise in its entirety. In common with many regional organisations, ECOWAS needs to reconcile its international mission with powerful national interests. It also finds itself in a particularly tricky situation: more than one third of its members are preparing for presidential elections in 2020. The organisation will face obstacles in mobilising the funds earmarked in Ouagadougou, since these countries will focus on their electoral processes or even prioritise the re-election of incumbent heads of state. Another challenge for ECOWAS is the insolvency of some of its members, such as the Sahel countries that lack the funds to pay for the G5 from their own budgets. The wealthiest contributor, Nigeria, is already contributing 70 per cent of the organisation's budget, and it can hardly be asked to give more.

For a group of poor and indebted countries, the advantage of spending such large sums on counter-terrorism initiatives is also arguable. Experience shows that money offers no guaranteed results. Nigeria spent $2 billion on defence in 2018, yet it has been unable to overpower Boko Haram, a terrorist group with only a few thousand fighters. The country has even been forced to call on Chad, whose defence spending ran to $233 million in 2018, for help.

The region must find smarter, more effective ways of containing the jihadist threat: greater coordination; better intelligence gathering and sharing; and more effective border controls, which will require tackling the corruption that is rife in many customs services and police forces. ECOWAS must use the money to fill the gaps rather than spend it on expensive military operations that have yet to deliver on their promises. Three large-scale operations in May and November 2018 formed part of the Accra Initiative. Although it is difficult to be certain of the actual level of involvement of the hundreds of people arrested, the over-representation of the Peul among them raises questions. Giving into stigmatisation of particular ethnic groups would spur jihadist recruitment among those groups - as already seen in the Sahel.

Countries in the region should avoid unrealistic quick fixes and instead implement counter-terrorism plans based on budgets that can be rolled over for the long term. Experts agree that combating active jihadist movements in West Africa requires a lengthy commitment.

The Ouagadougou summit has not dispelled doubts about ECOWAS's ability to collaborate more effectively with neighbouring regions, particularly North and Central Africa. Meanwhile, the crises in the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin have revealed the geographic spread of armed groups' activities. Member states in different regional groupings therefore need to come up with coordinated responses. In this sense, the same criticism that the G5 is too geographically limited to be effective in combating terrorism could also be levelled at ECOWAS. Jihadism transcends the borders of West Africa and affects other countries such as Chad.

ECOWAS has not yet said how it plans to coordinate its Ouagadougou roadmap with European initiatives on security and development in the Sahel. One question, for example, is how it will accommodate the new Partnership for Security and Stability for the Sahel, or P3S, announced in Biarritz in August 2019 by France and Germany. For the time being, P3S does not include ECOWAS as such - the first point of the communiqué announcing its existence does not mention the West African association, whereas it does refer to the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. But it might eventually welcome ECOWAS members. Like ECOWAS, the yet-to-be-finalised P3S seeks to improve coordination of security and development projects in the region, particularly those led by European partners.

More significantly, the ECOWAS summit in Ouagadougou focused on combating jihadist violence as opposed to dealing with political issues. In so doing, this high-level meeting perpetuated a simplistic reading of the violence over the past six years in the Sahel: one positing that the violence stems solely from terrorist acts, rather than other roots, such as rural insurgencies. To make any real difference, ECOWAS must be more politically engaged and less fixated on security issues. It could start by drawing a distinction between actions labelled as "terrorism"-related, such as the Grand-Bassam attacks in 2016, and rebellions in rural parts of the Sahel. If ECOWAS continues to be locked into a security paradigm, referring to all violence as terrorism, it risks overlooking the eminently political dimension of a crisis that can translate into outright rejection of governments and raise questions about states' ability to control conflicts over access to natural resources.

VI. The Threat of Political Crises

ECOWAS must play a broader political role to ward off another threat looming over the region: the risk of conflict connected to electoral processes. In various coastal countries with elections scheduled for next year, political actors are working "to rekindle polarisation, stirring up tensions and violence". In the near future, many member countries could find themselves severely weakened by these political tensions. The emphasis on security and terrorism must not overshadow the fact that political crises are often as deadly as clashes with armed groups. They also tend to weaken the armed forces by dividing them along party or ethnic lines. Political conflicts undo years of investment in training and force governments to use the security apparatus to monitor and punish their rivals. All these factors weaken their ability to tackle well-trained and well-prepared armed groups.

Tensions have been running high for the past several months in Benin, for example, after the executive branch moved to limit participation in the April 2019 legislative elections to two groups that support the president, Patrice Talon. Violence has broken out in various areas, leading to at least seven deaths in the capital Cotonou in May. The political dialogue announced by President Talon on 10 October is a pointless exercise because it excludes serious opposition. In neighbouring Togo, a political crisis pitting a fragmented opposition against a dynastic ruling party remains unresolved after four decades, and a presidential election is also coming up next year.

Côte d'Ivoire is likewise faced with several obstacles less than a year ahead of its presidential election scheduled for October 2020. No consensus has been reached on the electoral framework, with the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire, refusing to sit on the independent electoral commission. The disagreements between participants about the rules of the game augur a tense election whose result could be contested. The unease could even trigger violent protests and a pre-electoral crisis. Aggravating the situation still further, a few months ago the government launched a campaign of intimidation on the opposition, targeting high-profile figures, jeopardising the possibility of dialogue and fuelling resentment.

In Guinea, President Alpha Condé plans to run for a third term in 2020. His desire to amend the constitution accordingly has already sparked major protests, causing several deaths in October and November 2019. His determination to cling to power could eventually lead to ethnic conflicts between his group, the Malinké, and the country's predominant Peul population, who are the majority in the opposition parties.

In certain countries of the Gulf of Guinea, the commitment to engage in counter-terrorism initiatives is sometimes unclear. Governments have occasionally diverted funds intended for security operations to monitor or repress the opposition instead of dealing with the threat of armed groups. Similarly, some leaders have realised that trumpeting counter-terrorism initiatives brings rewards from their backers, in the form of either extra funding or greater tolerance for authoritarian rule.

The risk lies in the combustible mix of the spreading jihadist threat to the countries in the Gulf of Guinea and the onset of violent political clashes in the cities to the south of these countries. If such disturbances erupt in one or more coastal countries, security forces could deploy in the south, increasing the distance between capitals and northern territories, and opening the way for jihadist groups to move in. ECOWAS, with the support of experienced partners, particularly the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, should move as quickly as possible to contain the spread of political crises.

The regional organisation must condemn the attacks on fundamental rights occurring in some member states, such as the expulsion and intimidation of opposition members and the violent repression of protests. It should also remind its member countries about shared rules on electoral laws and independence of electoral bodies. In accordance with the protocol on democracy and good governance adopted by ECOWAS members on 21 December 2001, these governments should refrain from making "substantial modification [... ] to the electoral laws in the last six months before the elections" and ensure that the "bodies responsible for organizing the elections [are] independent or neutral and ... have the confidence of all the political actors".

VII. Conclusion

In 2020, for the first time in its post-independence history, West Africa could face a major crisis coupling political disturbances in the south with insecurity in the north. The combination of these two flashpoints could be catastrophic for the region. To avert this possibility, awareness of the danger must be raised at the highest possible level. Leaders need to recognise that terrorism is not the only threat in the area, and that regional interests must take precedence over private and national considerations. Otherwise, various heads of state will soon find themselves the leaders of countries in turmoil.

The Biafra Times

Contact us: [email protected]

Twitter:  @BiafraWriters

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Publisher: Charles Opanwa

US group releases report on Boko Haram, persecutions of Christians, multiple checkpoints in S'East, others

L-R International Human Rights Lawyer Emmanuel Ogebe, US Congressman Chris Smith
and Amnesty International staff Adotei Akwei in a Human Rights Day photo at Capital Hill (December 10, 2019)

December 11, 2019 | The Biafra Times

A US bases group has released a report of its latest findings in Nigeria.

The report made available by the US Nigeria Law group indicted the Federal Government over its silence on the persecution of Christians and multiple security checkpoints in the South East region of the country which have become oil well for security agencies who have resorted mainly to extortion of the hapless citizens.

The report read thus;

USNLG: Annual Human Rights Report on Nigeria: PART 1: GEN. BUHARI BUILDS A WALL

Last week, we concluded a fact finding mission to Nigeria and are releasing this report in commemoration of International Human Rights Day today.

PART A - ATROCITIES OF NON-STATE ACTORS

RESURGENCE OF TERRORIST TARGETING OF CHRISTIANS AND HOSTAGE-TAKING OF AID-WORKERS

During our visit to Nigeria, Boko Haram announced its abduction of several Nigerian Security agents and “eight Christians” in a renewed genocidal campaign of religious persecution.

This is a resurgence of it’s rogue roadblocks that claimed the lives of over 170 people in 2013 as terrorists dressed as soldiers checked IDs and beheaded Christians in a chainsaw massacre.

Also during our mission, a lecturer Dr Bitrus Zakka who teaches Christian Religious Knowledge was abducted at a checkpoint upon the discovery of a bible in his luggage. Educators are also targets of the terrorists. It is unclear if Dr Zakka is amongst the captives reported by the terrorists.

Boko Haram also claimed the capture of two “Christian” aid workers for the Red Cross.

Bearing in mind the execution of their Red Cross co-worker Hauwa  Liman last year and aid workers Lawrence Duna Dacighir and Godfrey Ali Shikagham this year, the recorded number of aid worker fatalities in Nigeria over the past decade is now in excess of 40. This averages one per quarter for 10 consecutive years!

This does not include UNICEF midwife Alice Ngaddah and 16 year old Christian heroine Schoolgirl Leah Sharibu held hostage for 649/659 days respectively and the

recent hostages from Action Against Hunger.

We note once more our prior alert that Boko Haram has again relaunched clear targeted attacks on the basis of religious identity. This is all the more worrisome given their impersonation of military personnel more so during the high risk Christmas season.

2. UPSURGE IN KIDNAP FOR RANSOM

Last Easter, the spouse of a relative of this researcher was abducted for ransom in northern Nigeria by Herdsmen.

Last month the husband of a relative of this researcher was also abducted in southern Nigeria by criminals. The statistical odds that this would occur to one individual within a six-month timeframe is highly indicative of the geometric rise in these sorts of crimes. Incidentally a justice of the court of appeal was also abducted. All instances cited above resulted in releases however British aid worker, Faye Mooney was killed in northern Nigeria also in a botched kidnapping.

Apart from the multi-state Herdsmen syndicates, kidnapping has become an opportunistic crime around the country in what can only be described as a resurgence of “localized slave trading.

3. SEPARATIST VIOLENCE

Members of the Separatist Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) group reportedly burnt to death two police officers in Nigeria’s southeast while we were in country. Although the group had not engaged in terrorist activity before it was outlawed for terrorism, this rare violent incident reportedly resulted in reprisals for the killing of half a dozen of its members.

4. HERDSMEN ATTACKS 

While there were no major massacres while in country, continuing low grade altercations occurred with Herdsmen grazing on farms or even simply burning farmers’ crops.                                     

PART B - ACTIONS OF STATE

5. COURT INVASION

While in Nigeria, the regime’s secret police released activists Sowore and Bakare from 125 days of detention but brazenly invaded a courtroom to rearrest them the next day in violation of the law, desecration of the court and disregard for court orders. The DSS had unlawfully invaded the Legislature last year and its boss was fired by Nigeria’s VP Osinbajo who was acting President at the time. However, the unlawful invasion of the court by the DSS has received no reaction from President Buhari besides justification.

6. LETHAL MILITARY FORCE IN NE

There are credible reports of indiscriminate air bombings that claimed the lives of innocent civilians gathering firewood in Northeast Nigeria. In addition, at least one known victim of a helicopter firing on defenseless voters during the “elections” in Kogi is battling for her life in hospital. The use of lethal air munitions on defenseless citizens on the ground has become a recurring phenomenon since the mass casualty attacks on a Rann IDP Camp.

7. POLICE EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS IN SE

There were also reports of the killing of at least six members of IPOB in southeastern Nigeria. Postings to the southeast are reportedly at a premium as policemen prefer to be at the numerous lucrative checkpoints that extort motorists. There were reports of a driver killed for not giving a 50 naira bribe (seven cents). A Nigerian American journalist visiting reported that his taxi was stopped by a policeman who demanded money from him (the journalist) and not the driver. Uber drivers complained that they had to remove their Uber stickers due to targeting and harassment by policemen.

8. JUDICIAL MANIPULATION

There were further signs of the manipulation of the judiciary in the handling of election appeals challenging Gen. Buhari’s dubious elections.                         

I. Contrary to long-standing procedure, the Supreme Court did not constitute a panel of the most senior justices to hear the case.                 

II. A senior justice with familial ties to the opposition party was not allowed to sit on the case while another justice with ties to the ruling party was allowed to.                                       

III. A senior justice who had given a dissenting judgment contradicting the bizarre Osun case where the governorship was spuriously awarded to the ruling party was also not on the panel.     

IV. A justice who was approached by a government minister to award governorship of a state to the ruling party but refused and was then arrested by the government was on the panel.                               

V. The new CJN who was foisted on the judiciary after the unlawful ouster of Chief Justice Onnoghen was also on the panel.         

VI. The court dismissed the election challenge without hearing it.

9. The state of Gombe in northern Nigeria is the latest to fail to confirm a female Christian, Justice Beatrice Iliya, as Chief Judge of the State pursuant to the constitution. Like Justice Elizabeth Karatu of Kebbi State, earlier this year, she has been replaced by a junior male Muslim judge of debatable pedigree after having acted as Chief Judge. This is the third high profile female Christian Judge to face obstacles to confirmation in northern Nigeria. Justice Patricia Mahmoud was similarly denied Chief Judgeship in Kano State on account of her Christian Faith. The case of Justice Beatrice Iliya is not yet final but the unfortunate precedent by Gen. Buhari’s illegal removal of Nigeria’s first southern Chief Justice in 30 years and his replacement with a northern Muslim does not inspire confidence. There is palpable public concern at a systematic northernization and Islamization of government at both federal and state levels. While the expired tenures of numerous northern Muslim officials have been illegally extended, those of southerners are abruptly cut short or not renewed.

10. CENSORSHIP and REPRESSION - the Nigerian Government is institutionalizing repression as statecraft. A wall has been built around the Unity Fountain in Abuja that had become a recognized staging ground for protests. Parliamentarians from the US and Europe are amongst foreign dignitaries who had addressed activists such as Bring Back Our Girls Group there. After over a year of the stationing of police to harass protesters, a wall has been built to further shut down civic dissent and citizen activism.                           Where other leaders build walls to protect their citizens, Gen. Buhari has built a wall to prevent his citizens.   The building of the wall is symbolic of repression under the Buhari regime which has now outdone his prior military junta for its crass demolition and denudation of Democracy. Like his first coming 36 years ago, Buhari’s second coming is also synonymous with the destruction of democracy in Nigeria again.

A Hate Speech Bill in the parliament appears to be a reiteration of his draconian Decree 4 of 1984 which even then did not prescribe capital punishment for outlawed speech.

To be continued.


EMMANUEL OGEBE
US NIGERIA LAW GROUP

The Biafra Times

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Publisher: Charles Opanwa

South-East commuters lament extortion, high level of intimidation by soldiers

November 10, 2019 | The Biafra Times

Raphael Ede

Enugu - Commuters and drivers plying various roads in the South-East have lamented the high level of intimidation and extortion by soldiers at checkpoints.

Some of them, who spoke to PUNCH Metro, said the worst was that anybody making calls close to the checkpoints were having their phones seized, smashed on the road or required to pay between N500 and N1,500 to retrieve the phones.

In some cases, commuters and drivers of such vehicles are detained for hours before they are released after much pleading.

A commuter, who identified himself as Victor Okonkwo, who witnessed the atrocities of the soldiers recently, narrated his experience to our correspondent on Monday.

He said, “On Tuesday, October 22, 2019, I was returning from Owerri in a Sienna car and there were seven passengers in the vehicle. When we got to the Ihe community, one of the passengers received a call and he was on that call till we got to a military checkpoint near the University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital.

“The man got the shock of his life when a soldier spotted him and seized his phone for answering a call while passing by the checkpoint. He paid N500 to retrieve his phone after we had spent over an hour begging the soldiers. There were more than 10 mobile phones seized from other commuters by the soldiers, while the owners were there begging for leniency.”

Okonkwo stated that he had experienced the cruelty of the soldiers in 2014 at the same checkpoint, even as he said he heard that soldiers at other checkpoints around Enugu State boundaries were committing similar atrocities.

He said, “I was coming back from Owerri in a bus with other passengers. On getting to the military checkpoint near the University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital along the Enugu-Port Harcourt Expressway, a lady’s phone was seized and smashed on the road for answering a call while passing through the checkpoint.

“There was a similar incident, when a passenger’s phone was seized by soldiers for also answering a call; it took the intervention of the driver and some commuters before the phone was returned to the owner.

“This is what commuters experience on a daily basis in the hands of soldiers at the checkpoints.”

Checks by PUNCH Metro revealed that the soldiers had devised other means of collecting money from drivers and commuters at the checkpoints, as they now commission young men from the communities, who act as fronts to collect money on their behalf.

A source, who witnessed an incident a few months ago, narrated how a young man was shot dead by soldiers in the Isiala Ngwa South Local Government Area of Abia State.

According to the source, a drama played out on the day of the incident when a military officer spotted the man collecting money at the checkpoint on behalf of the soldiers.

When accosted, the soldiers denied ever knowing the young man.

“One of the officers immediately ordered one of the soldiers to shoot the tax collector for denting their image and he was instantly shot dead. My greatest surprise is that till today, those soldiers have not been held accountable for the gruesome murder of the young man. Many of such cases have gone the same way without anyone being held accountable.”

It is the same story at almost all the military checkpoints in the boundaries of Enugu-Ebonyi, Enugu-Nsukka, Enugu-Obollo-Afor, and the Enugu-Awka-Onitsha Expressway. Extortion, intimidation and outright corporal punishment are the hallmark of the checkpoints.

“Are we in a war situation that somebody receiving phone calls cannot pass by military checkpoints in the South-East without harassment and intimidation and our so-called leaders are not talking?” a commuter asked.

When the Nigerian Army Human Rights Desk was contacted, there was no response as the phone rang out.

When the Deputy Director, Army Public Relations, 82 Division, Enugu, Col. Aliyu Yusuf, was contacted, he said in a text message, “Good afternoon, inform the affected persons to call and give details for further necessary action immediately.”

SOURCE: PUNCH.NG

The Biafra Times

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Publisher: Charles Opanwa

Biafra: WIC to present case against Nigeria to UN, world powers

The Biafra Times | September 9, 2019

By Magnus Eze

The World Igbo Congress (WIC) rose from its annual convention in Houston, Texas, United States with a resolve to adopt diplomacy in the push for emancipation and possibly the independent state of Biafra.

A communiqué from the gathering also dwelt on several myriads currently plaguing the Igbo nation.

These included security of life and property in Igboland; the menace of the herdsmen, as well as the future of the Igbo regarding association with her neighbours among others.

The convention also discussed how to support WIC to fully play the leadership role that will be beneficial to Ndigbo and the promotion of synergy among all Diaspora Igbo organisations.

The communiqué issued by Secretary-General of WIC, Dr. Richard Nwachukwu, after its deliberations, indicated that the Igbo would approach the United Nations and the world powers to present their case against the Nigerian Federation.

It restated the call for the immediate relocation of Igbo businesses’ headquarters to Ala-Igbo in order to protect them from frequent and unwarranted attacks.

Other decisions from the convention were that all Igbo support the congress which in turn is mandated to provide leadership in galvanizing Diaspora Igbo and pursue a plan of action leading to the information acquisition and dissemination necessary to promote investment in Igbo land.

To promote and support technology transfer through mobilisation and active engagement of well-connected young Igbo entrepreneurs in the Diaspora to Ala Igbo, the congress agreed that it should work with Ndi-Igbo and progressive government functionaries.

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The congress also agreed that it should pursue the establishment of Diaspora Igbo database so as to assist in strategic planning for the security and economic improvement of Igboland.

While lamenting that the 1999 constitution currently in effect in Nigeria, does not have referendum in any of the schedules,  it resolved to supplement the pursuit of Igbo emancipation through diplomacy and engagement of foreign powers, the United Nations and regional powers in matters involving the region politically, economically, militarisation, suppression, and persecution of Ndi-Igbo in Nigeria.

“Over the years, people in diaspora of different nations of the world, have been the key players and drivers of nation-building and economic emancipation of their homelands. It resolved that the congress should take the leadership role like other diaspora groups like Jewish Congress, apply pressure and lobbying mechanism to achieve Igbo emancipation.

“It is resolved that WIC should, through Association of Southeast Town Unions, establish formidable intelligence units in Ala-Igbo, as well as reinforce vigilante groups in Ala-Igbo to ensure that Igbo land is protected.

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The WIC also urged Nigeria to actively support religious freedom by signing the Roundtable on Ministerial Inter-Religious Freedom which other countries are signatories.

It also unanimously resolved that every adult Igbo in the Diaspora should donate a minimum of $20 annually to the congress’ special account to serve as a token of commitment and bolster the achievement of the mandates outlined.

The Biafra Times

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Twitter:  @BiafraWriters

Publisher: Charles Opanwa