Self-Determination: Northern Protesters Should Demand For Referendum Not Military Takeover To End Bad Governance

 Self-Determination: Northern Protesters Should Demand For Referendum Not Military Takeover To End Bad Governance

The ongoing nationwide protests in Nigeria has taken turn into a concerning dimension where Some  protesters in the North were seen calling for the military to take over power, raising and waving the Russian flags at the same time burning the Nigerian flags. This has raised concerns amongst local and international observers. 

The protests in Northern Nigeria, especially in Kano and Kaduna, has highlighted the deep divisions and accumulated frustrations existing within the region. While some northern protesters are calling for the Nigerian military to intervene and take over power from the Tinubu's led government in Abuja, there's tension within the hierarchies of the federal government to stop the protest. 

However, this is not the right approach. Instead, Northern protesters should start demanding their right to self-determination and a referendum on total independence essentially the establishment of Arewa Islamic republic or whatever name they deem fit. 

The northern youths, population whom the hardship  stemming from president Tinubu's fuel subsidy removal and other poor economic policies took the most toll on, have since August 1 taken to the streets expressing their frustrations and grievances. 

Grievances include high cost of living, insecurity, inflation and religious/ethnic tensions. Meanwhile, protests erupted across the country over issues like bad governance, corruption, insecurity, poor economic conditions, and gross dissatisfaction with the presidency of Ahmed Bola Tinubu. 

However, rather than calling for a military takeover, northern protesters should focus their efforts on securing their democratic right to self-determination. This could take the form of a referendum where northerners can vote on whether to form an independent state, maintain the current federal structure with more regional autonomy, or seek other political arrangements. 

Moreso, history has shown that military coups rarely solve the underlying political and social problems that fuel unrest. In fact, military dictatorships often exacerbate tensions and human rights abuses. The Nigerian military with lots of human rights abuses will be a nightmare to ordinary people. The path to lasting peace and stability must come through democratic means that give a voice to the diverse regions and ethnicities in Nigeria. 

Calling for military intervention also sets a dangerous precedent that could undermine the relative security owing to the terrorists infiltration into the Nigerian military hierarchies. At this point, the Nigerian military is not a saint or guiltless of corruption and bad leadership, the current realities in the country show they are not a suitable option to ending bad governance either. So, it is dead on arrival as such attempt could embolden other ethnic factions into staging counter coups within the same military, thereby promote violence and instability. 

Instead, the northern protesters should focus their energy on advocating for plebiscite; a democratic process that allows the people of the region to decide their own political future. This could take the form of a referendum on independence or increased autonomy, giving various ethnic groups north a direct say in shaping their destiny going forward. 

Self-determination is a fundamental human right recognized under international laws. The African Charter on Peoples' Rights also affirms the right of indigenous peoples' to self-determination. By pursuing this path, northern Nigerians could chart a course that is both legitimate and sustainable, rather than relying on the unpredictable and often destabilizing actions of the military. 

Furthermore, a referendum would provide an opportunity for open and transparent dialogue on the challenges facing the north and potential solutions. This would help build consensus, address grievances, and ultimately lead to a more stable and equitable arrangement for all ethnic groups in the North. 

While the current situation in Nigeria is undoubtedly dire, a military takeover is not close to the solution. The northern protesters should as a matter of necessity join IPOB led by Mazi Nnamdi Kanu and direct their efforts towards securing the democratic right to self-determination through a referendum. This would be a more principled and constructive approach to resolving the region's pressing issues and grievances as well as ending bad governance entirely.

Family Writers Press International

IPOB PRESS RELEASE: IPOB WORLDWIDE REJECT ANY SURGERY ON OUR LEADER INSIDE DSS DUNGEON.

12th June , 2023

This is the sequel to the deteriorating health condition of our leader Mazi Nnamdi KANU and the proposed ear surgery by Nigeria Government and DSS medical team. IPOB completely rejects any ill-concieved surgery on our leader, Mazi Nnamdi KANU, the leader of IPOB, who has been illegally and unconstitutionally detained in DSS  dungeon for 2 years without charge. We reiterate that he should be released to his personal physicians who will perform the prescribed ear surgery on him.  

We want to draw the attention of IPOB worldwide, all  lovers of freedom and lovers of Biafra on the dangerous plans to neutralize Mazi Nnamdi Kanu through ear surgery by the enemies on DSS medical team. 

It's obvious that DSS has intentions to eliminate our leader through this  ill-conceived ear surgery. That's why they refused to allow Mazi Nnamdi KANU access to his personal and trusted physicians. 

Therefore, we reject any DSS or Nigeria Government sponsored surgery on our leader while he is still being detained illegally in solitary confinement. 

It's true that our leader requires urgent ear surgery from the injury the Nigeria Agents inflicted on him when he was kidnapped and tortured in Kenya however, such surgery will not take place while he is still inside DSS dungeon. What will happen if he develops any medical complications during or after the surgery in the detention facilities? Mazi Nnamdi KANU must be unconditionally released as the courts ordered or released on medical grounds to attend to his health. 

If Nigerian DSS could not find a qualified ENT doctor to handle Buhari’s ear infections during his eight years in office, how come DSS suddenly have qualified ENT doctors in their team to carry out ear surgery on Mazi Nnamdi Kanu? The same way Buhari was a leader of a nation is the same way Mazi Nnamdi KANU is a leader of 75m people of Biafra Nation. IPOB is capable of taking our leader to any part of the world for the best medical services.

We, therefore, once again call on the Nigeria Government and DSS to release Mazi Nnamdi Okwuchukwu KANU. If anything untoward happens to him, they will dance to any tune IPOB will play for them. We warn them with their  cohorts who are showcasing some doctors as Mazi Nnamdi Kanu's doctors to cease and desist. 

We urge Biafrans to oppose the planned ear surgery on Mazi Nnamdi KANU as planned by Nigeria Government and DSS agents.

There are serious indications that Mazi Nnamdi Kanu will not make it alive if he goes into any operation under the enemies supervision. Mazi Chinasa Nworu will be coming on the air by the weekend to speak on this serious subject and the risk associated with the enemy's planned ear surgery on our leader. 

Let the Nigeria Government and DSS release Mazi Nnamdi Kanu to his personal physicians to handle the ear surgery. DSS, who were responsible for his ear injury through the brutal torture, can not be trusted to heal him by surgery on the same ear.  Moreso, DSS must not force or medically subdue our leader in order to perform any surgery on him because that will be a declaration of war on Biafrans. If they want to see, let them try such rubbish. Mazi Nnamdi KANU needs urgent surgery, and the only option acceptable to us IPOB worldwide is his unconditional release as ordered by the courts or release on medical grounds to his personal physicians for the said ear surgery. 

We call on IPOB and MNK legal teams both home and abroad to reject the Nigeria Government's proposed ear surgery on Mazi Nnamdi KANU. Mazi Nnamdi Kanu’s wife and his siblings must reject such an offer, too.  Mazi Nnamdi KANU is the leader of over 75 million indigenous people of Biafra, and his health is a national concern that must not be handled carelessly. DSS and those  parading doctors in Abuja should know that Mazi Nnamdi KANU is no longer owned by the KANU family. He is now the property of 75 million Biafran people.  

In summary, IPOB, Ndigbo, and Biafrans say NO EAR SURGERY on our leader, Mazi Nnamdi KANU, by the Nigeria Government, DSS, or any other groups' medical team while he is still being illegally detained inside DSS dungeon. Instead, we call for his release from illegal detention for his private ENT doctors to handle the ear surgery. 

COMRADE EMMA POWERFUL,  MEDIA, AND PUBLICITY SECRETARY FOR IPOB.

How The Global Press Describes Nigerian Elections And Elected President

   How The Global Press Describes Nigerian Elections And Elected President 

Tinubu

The Economist said a “chaotically organized vote and messy count” gave Nigeria a new president. 

The Financial Times said in an editorial comment that Nigerian presidential election was “deeply flawed” and the winner “a wealthy political fixer.” 

The Guardian of U.K. described the winner as “an immensely wealthy veteran powerbroker trailed by corruption allegations which he denies.” 

The New York Times described him as “a divisive figure in Nigerian politics.” 

Robert Rotberg, founding director of the Harvard Kennedy School's programme on intrastate conflict, wrote an opinion for Canada's influential Globe and Mail; its headline: “Bola Tinubu's election is another triumph for Nigeria's corrupt old guard.” 

The Times of London was the most disrespectful. It used this very bad phrase: “a wealthy kleptocratic 'godfather' of politics” to describe the person who will replace very clean Buhari on May 29, 2023. As bad as those characterizations are, they are not as damaging as the Financial Times' revelation that it personally “witnessed armed men remove a presidential ballot box in Surulere, Lagos” on Election Day.

The CNN last Friday played back a part of Bola Tinubu's acceptance speech where he described what he got as “a serious mandate.” A CNN anchor then asked if it “was really a mandate” with less than 10 percent of the registered voters behind it. He must be wondering what kind of people are these? The CNN and that anchor were not the only ones bemused by our electoral culture, our elections and their outcomes. 

One of Germany's largest newspapers, Sueddeutsche Zietung, had unflattering words for the winner; it also queried the legitimacy of a mandate that was spurned by 90 per cent of the voting population. 

Aljazeera ran a special report on how the election was disrupted in Lagos last Saturday. The headline is: 'How violence robs Nigerians of their votes.' 

The Washington Post quoted Matthew Page, associate fellow with Chatham House’s Africa Program, as accusing INEC of making both deliberate and unintentional mistakes: “They raised the hopes about the election and its transparency, and then they dashed them. When the opposition says the process was broken, it’s hard to argue with them.” 

Foreign election observers from the US International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) summed up their opinion of the election as falling “well short of Nigerian citizens’ legitimate and reasonable expectations.” 

I have spent the past five days reading informed commentaries and listening to credible voices. I have not seen, read or heard a single positive review of the election in any credible media in any country of the world. I have been around long enough to conclude that Tinubu's 2023 mandate is rivaled in content, texture and review probably only by Shehu Shagari's Verdict '83 mandate.

Other Newspaper Headlines from around the world

Austria:

A drug baron wins the presidential election in Africa’s biggest economy. 

Poland:

Nigeria chooses a known drug lord as LEADER.

Canada:

"Depression, anxiety, uncertainty be-clouds Nigeria’s political space a drug-kingpin wins the election."

This is stinking!

Published By Family Writers Press International 

Women Across Three Biafran States Stormed The Streets, Demands The Unconditional Release Of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, Calls For A Referendum Date

 Women Across Three Biafran States Stormed The Streets, Demands The Unconditional Release Of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, Calls For A Referendum Date

The Biafran Women in Anambra, Abia and Enugu States flooded the streets of the South-East States on 16th December, 2022 in peaceful protests; asking Buhari(Nigerian President), Malami(Nigerian Attorney-General), and all those that are responsible for the lawless Piloting of the affairs of Nigeria, to free the Kidnapped and illegally detained leader of the Indigenous People Of Biafra(IPOB), Mazi Nnamdi Kanu.  The Biafran women stated that Kanu has been discharged and acquitted by a Federal Appellate Court of competent jurisdiction on 13th October, 2022. The women also called on Nigeria government and the United Nations(UN) to fix a referendum date for Biafrans to decide their fate.

Anambra was not left out as everywhere in Biafra land today was rocked with #FreeNnamdiKanu & give us date for Biafra referendum protest. IPOB is not losing grip in our quest for freedom. #FreeBiafra @_AfricanUnion @KremlinRussia @netanyahu @JoeBiden @RishiSunak @antonioguterres pic.twitter.com/bBYDdB9xJY

— Emeka Gift Official (@EmekaGift100) December 16, 2022

We all can also recall that other Nigerian courts of competent jurisdiction in both Abuja and Umuahia, quashed all the count charges against Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, affirmed and ordered for his immediate release. But, Nigeria government have not complied to the instructions since over 2-month after the verdicts. This blatant act of disregard to court orders have been locally and internationally described as total dishonest and impunity of the executive to the judiciary and conscience of humanity. 

According one of the protesters who granted interview to Family Writers Press International(FWPI), “these barbaric tactics and uncivilized attitudes of Nigeria government and its security agencies have gradually grown very unbearable, especially as it concerns the illegal detention of the IPOB Leader". "This is why the Biafran women across these Biafra land decided to march out in protest", She said. 

Continuing, she narrated how the women had long kept silent, expecting that the Nigeria state would obey court orders. But in view of how Lawless Nigeria have become in repeatedly ignoring the order of courts and United Nations working group, these women determined to storm the street in demand for the freedom of the IPOB Leader. 

Biafra Women Stormed The Street Of Enugu, Demands The Unconditional Release Of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu.

16 December, 2022

Source: Family Writers Press International.@_AfricanUnion @antonioguterres @netanyahu @KremlinRussia @GiorgiaMeloni @POTUS @giladerdan1 @RishiSunak @EU_Commission pic.twitter.com/zts56b0AUe

— Emeka Gift Official (@EmekaGift100) December 16, 2022

The incident unanimously took place within the same day, and around the same hours of the day. The women demonstrated with placards and showed how unsatisfied they are with the continuous detention of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu and other Biafran activists, despite the orders from different courts of competent jurisdictions.

Some of the banners and placards read, "The journey of nine (9) months is painful, we cannot keep calm to watch our son die for a crime he never committed! #RELEASE NNAMDI KANU NOW" while some others read, "Our demand is simple: #FREE NNAMDI KANU", "No going back on the Appeal Court's Judgement: Nnamdi Kanu is Discharged and Acquitted" etcetera.

There is heavy protest everywhere in Biafra land demanding the immediate release of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu as the court ruled . We are getting multiply report that this protest is happening in almost all the states in Biafra land.. More report soon #FreeBiafra @_AfricanUnion pic.twitter.com/wBwz8xMoFE

— Emeka Gift Official (@EmekaGift100) December 16, 2022

Biafrans have wondered why the international community is yet to do anything concerning this uncultured act from Nigeria, even when the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention have lent their voice in also asking Nigeria to free Kanu unconditionally. But, one thing is certain: justice must prevail one day. 

FWPI have also gathered that all who involved in the protests from the three states have returned peacefully too, to their various locations. 

Family Writers Press International, reporting.

Nnamdi Kanu demands N20bn compensation, apologies from Malami for saying he "jumped bail" despite Court clearance

 Nnamdi Kanu demands N20bn compensation, apologies from Malami for saying he "jumped bail" despite Court clearance

The leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra, IPOB, Nnamdi Kanu has demanded N20 billion as compensation from the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Abubakar Malami.

Kanu demanded compensation following alleged defamatory and libellous claims against him.

Speaking through his Special Counsel, Aloy Ejimakor, the IPOB leader, said Malami’s claim that he jumped bail despite a court order clearing him was libellous.

Recall that the military had invaded Kanu’s premises at Isiama Afaraukwu Ibeku, Abia State on 10th September, 2017, and this led to him fleeing the country.

The alleged invasion was contested and tagged a violation of Kanu’s fundamental human right.

But, the courts ruled that the invasion was unlawful, illegal, and unconstitutional.

Speaking on the issue, Malami was quoted as saying: “To release or not to release Nnamdi Kanu is a function of law and the rule of law for that matter. In arriving at a decision on whether to release or not release, is one; you look at the rule of law, two; you look at the public and the national interest, three; you look at the security situation, four; you look at the international diplomacy.

“Let me talk first of the rule of law. This is someone that has been granted bail on account of charges that have been preferred against him at the court. Someone jumping bail to the international community, a case of a fugitive is established against the background of jumping the bail.

“Two, arising from the national security, this is someone that is charged with treason, incitement and destruction of civil authority, murder and assassination of others on account of his incitement, that boils down to issues of national security and criminality.

“Three, on account of international diplomacy, this is someone that has against his person, used the international community or a foreign country to launch an attack against a nation, against his nation for that matter.

“So all these naturally come into play to determine what to do. So if you have, through judicial processes, established multiple cases of treason, homicide, and bail-jumping, among others, the fact that you have indeed succeeded in one case as against multiple others that are pending, goes to establish the fact that that case cannot be the only basis and criterion for determining whether you are entitled to be released or not.”

Condemning Malami’s remark, Ejimakor said: “Despite the clear exoneration from jumping bail contained in the Judgment exhibited and quoted above, you have, after 19th January 2022 when this judgment was rendered, defamed and libelled our Client by your several utterances and publications (in national dailies) where you falsely stated that our Client jumped bail.

“In view of the said judgment of the Abia State High Court, your above utterances were false, malicious and reckless and they were read and heard worldwide and portrayed our Client in light.

Ejimakor stated this in a letter addressed to Malami tagged: “RE: Pre-action notice and formal demand for settlement of the claim of defamation/libel of the character of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu grounded on your false, defamatory and libelous publications that Mazi Nnamdi Kanu jumped bail.”

The letter reads partly: “The sum of N20,000,000,000.00 (Twenty Billion Naira only) being general and exemplary damages.

“An unreserved personal letter of apology, to be prominently and boldly published full-page in two Nigerian Newspapers of national circulation, namely: Guardian Newspaper and Sun Newspaper.

“You shall write and deliver to your superior officer(s) and/or your employer(s) a Legal Opinion to the effect that our Client did not jump bail in view of the 19th January 2022 Judgment of the High Court of Abia State.

“The foregoing demands are without prejudice to other options or terms for settlement that you may counter-propose in response to this Letter. We, therefore, request that, with a view to settling this claim out of court, you respond to this Letter by Legal Mail (to the email on this Letterhead) within three (3) days of the receipt of this Letter. In the event that you fail to do so, our Client shall immediately commence legal proceedings against you without any further notice.”

We Have No Hand In The Murder Of Eze Obudi Agwa In Oguta Lga Imo State - IPOB

   We Have No Hand In The Murder Of Eze Obudi Agwa In Oguta Lga Imo State - IPOB

The Indigenous People of Biafra, IPOB, has distanced the Eastern Security Network, ESN, from the gruesome murder of the traditional ruler of Obudi Agwa in Oguta Council area of Imo State, Ignatius Asor.

IPOB said ESN had no problem with the murdered traditional ruler, hence could not have killed him.

Emma Powerful, the spokesman of IPOB, linked the murder of the traditional ruler to the Imo State Governor, Hope Uzodinma.

Powerful alleged that Uzodinma, in connection with Ebubeagu, murdered the late traditional ruler.

He accused the governor of recruiting criminals, including Niger Delta militants, to murder and destroy the properties of those against the alleged Fulanization agenda in Imo State.

A statement by Powerful reads:

We the global movement and family of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) ably lead by the great and indefatigable leader Mazi Nnamdi KANU wish to disassociate IPOB and ESN from the gruesome murder of the Traditional Ruler of Obudi Agwa in Oguta Local Government  Area of Imo State. 

It is in the public domain, the records of how Hope Uzodinma used his Ebubeagu militia in the mindless  massacre of many Izombe indigens.

Today the Imo Vampire, Hope Uzodima has directed his murderous Ebubeagu militia to eliminate an innocent Traditional Ruler for condemning his killing of his people and burning of their houses. Hope Uzodima is an agent of destruction and darkness for the same people he forced himself to become their Governor.

He recruited notorious armed and criminal militias including Niger Delta militants to murder and destroy the properties of innocent civilians who don't support his Fulanization agenda in Imo State.

It is unfortunate that Nigeria media  do not conduct  independent investigations before publishing their news reports. We are aware that Hope Uzodinma regularly hosts some willing News editors for dinner to luander and promote his criminalities in the State. Hope Uzodinma should tell the world the crime committed  by the Traditional Ruler that  warranted his murder. 

HRH Eze (Dr) Ignatius Asor of Obudi Agwa of Oguta LGA had no problem with IPOB and ESN. IPOB and ESN don't kill our own. The Royal Father was murderered by Hope Uzodinma's Ebubeagu militia because the man asked him to stop his murderous actions against his subjects.

IPOB has no hand in this barbarism and we cannot be involved in killing innocent citizens of Biafra that we are dying and going to prison to save. We commiserate with the families of the Monarch and those murdered in cold-blood at Obudi Agwa in Oguta LGA, Imo State. 

The Command spokesman of police in Imo State, CSP Micheal Abattam should stop their usual public deception and properly investigate and identify the killers of this Royal Father instead of falsely blaming IPOB and ESN. The game of arranging innocent people and have them to falsely claim to be IPOB members or ESN operatives so as to justify their blackmail is over. 

We are urging all Traditional Rulers and Religious Leaders in Biafraland to understand that there is danger and all should beef up their personal security. There is danger ahead because our enemies are relentlessly extorting and waging war against our leaders. 

COMRADE EMMA POWERFUL, MEDIA AND PUBLICITY SECRETARY FOR IPOB.

Vision 2020-20 and the Hopelessness of the Nigerian State

 

By Nelson Ofokar Yagazie | The Biafra Times

September 30, 2022

“And what became of Vision 2020-20 now?” I asked myself, suddenly realizing that we are already in the last quarter of 2022, two years behind the promised year. Arms folded over a bare chest, one leg crossed over the other, I lolled back in the sofa, staring blankly into the thin air as bitter memories galloped through my mental frame.

More than a decade ago, we were being placated by the scammers running Nigeria with Vision 2020-20 project – a project aimed at launching Nigeria into the world’s 20 topmost economy by the year 2020. In their thoughtlessness, the nerveless non-analytical stomach-driven political stooges parading as pressmen in this failed British experiment called Nigeria ran away with it, helping the scamming old vultures to drive home their fraud. And because we have been so psychologically raped and mentally eclipsed, we swallowed the pill hook, line and sinker, smiling at our doom and singing praises to our predators.

2020 has come and gone. The bogus and much hyped project was nowhere near being achieved, and no one even dignified it with a mere mention. As with the rest of Nigeria’s projects, it went down the drain as if never dreamt up.

This is 2022, and it’s fast sliding by. No one talks about Vision 2020 anymore – not the government, not their ass-licking press, not you and I who, although have been fooled over and over again, still submit ourselves for further pranks. We are in 2022, yet we are nowhere close to the world’s 20 topmost economy. In contrary, we are even sliding lower into oblivion, debt rate increasing, productivity decreasing.

Today we are again being promised the unimaginable. The politicians are at it again. We are being told that by 2023 this sham we mistake for a country will be producing aircraft spare parts and, like victims of psychological rape we are, we believe this yarn, with the more mentally inept even clapping for our mental rapists.

The promises of a better Nigeria are akin to the promises of a horny man to a whore. Fact that Nigerian youths fall for the same deceit over and over again puts a question mark on our collective claim on intellectualism.  Nigeria is a country where tribalism and religion are more important than technological growth. No such country ever develops.

It’s our choice to either go our separate ways and grow like India and Pakistan, Malaysia and Singapore, or remain forcefully lumped together while holding ourselves down.

The Biafra Times
Publisher: Chijindu Benjamin Ukah

Contact us: [email protected] 

PEOPLE'S VIEWS ABOUT THE COUNTRY CALLED NIGERIA (PART 2)

PEOPLE'S VIEWS ABOUT THE COUNTRY CALLED NIGERIA (PART 2)

It may be surprising to hear the Sarduana of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, whom Nigerians refer to as one of the founding fathers, to be quoted to have said that: "The mistake of 1914 has come to the fore". Since 1914, the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs, and do not show any sign of willingness to unite. Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country", Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa stated in the year 1948. Chief Obafemi Awolowo speaking from experience in 1947 said: "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression". And totally dissatisfied and discontented with the Nigerian entity, this man during the war, ironically stated that the task to keep Nigeria one, was a task to be done. This was the man who orchestrated the killing of over five million Biafrans including children, women and the elderly, in their mad drive for unworkable union. The Nigerian arch-genocidist, General Yakubu Gowon in 1966, pointedly stated that: "The basis for unity is not there". All these lend credence to the declaration by Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), that Nigeria is nothing more than a zoo. President Donald John Trump of the United States of America, called Nigeria a shithole. Bill Gate once said that Nigeria is the worst place to be on earth for women to give birth. Jim Iyke, a popular Nollywood actor once stated that Nigeria is a joke of Africa. Even President Buhari lent his voice in the woeful description when he said that Nigerians are thieves and the youths are lazy.

And in what appeared like a wrap up of all, Tunde Fagbenle in the year 2011 accentuated: "This country is in a mess. It is a jumbled, forced grouping of desperate people with widely differing developmental visions, life views, social inclinations and moral values. For some parts of the country, education is everything and parents would go hungry in order to send their wards to school. For some other parts, education is "foolishness" and something to be rejected. For some parts, religion is a matter of choice and does not debar cohabiting with those of different religious bend. For some other parts, religion is everything and it is righteousness to kill those who do not share of your religious values. For some parts, the rich and the poor may eat from the same bowl. For some other parts, it is an anathema and the importance of the rich, is by how far removed from the ordinary man. All these do not make any one group better than another. They only point to the fact that we are such different groups of people".

Nigeria still exists because of the pretense from self-centered politicians who use Nigeria as their platform for business ventures. Islamic adherents on the other hand firmly believe that if Nigeria is Islamised, the entirety of Africa will automatically become a purely Islamic continent. A Nigerian by established facts as earlier referenced by the views of experienced observers, fully represents disaster, terrorism, corruption, retrogression and all classes of evil. Living in Nigeria, clearly depicts a foretaste of hell. Nigeria is a destiny destroyer, an unfit entity for the habitation of the sane by every standard.

Written by Obulose Chidiebere N.

Edited by Peter Oshagwu
For Family Writers Press International

Iran vs USA: Eyes on Africa as Iran looks to hit US interests

Iranian demonstrators chant slogans during a protest in Tehran on Friday against the killing of the Soleimani, head of the elite Quds Force, and al-Muhandis. (West Asia News Agency/Nazanin Tabatabaee via Reuters)

January 05, 2020 | The Biafra Times

WASHINGTON - Africa could emerge as a venue for confrontation between the U.S. and Iran as Tehran threatens to retaliate after the U.S. airstrike that killed the Iranian Quds Force commander, General Qassem Soleimani.

Iran has sought to increase its influence in certain countries in Africa in recent years through activities such as arms sales, training fighters for combat in the Middle East and funding Shia sects. It also has significant trade relations with several countries, including South Africa.

Phillip Smyth, a Soref Fellow at The Washington Institute who studies Shia Islamist militarism, said that he does not necessarily expect the Iranians to strike immediately. He noted that they have historically been cautious and look for what he calls “plausible deniability” to avoid detection when they attack.

When they do strike, he said, it is possible they will look for a soft target in an unexpected location.

“The Iranians are going to want to show that they have influence on a global scale and they may look for low-hanging fruit or easier targets that they can go after,” Smyth said. “And that may very well occur in Africa. And it could very well occur in North America or Europe or in many other places,” he said.

Smyth said Hezbollah, which is supported by Iran, has recruited and trained Nigerians for years. A 2018 report by the Middle East Institute said Iran had instructed Hezbollah to increase its training of Nigerians and hoped to use Nigeria as a base of operations to launch attacks and “thwart Israeli and Western ambitions in the region.”

There have also been West African fighters who, after converting to Shia Islam, traveled and fought alongside Iranians in Syria. Iranians have similarly supported fighters from other parts of the world to join them in various conflicts.

READ ALSO: British govt ‘worst enemy’ of Nigeria - Nnamdi Kanu

“There are tens of thousands of fighters that the Iranians have mobilized and used for conflicts in Iraq, in Syria and in Yemen. They have a very strong alliance and kind of proxy relationship with Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis. So they have quite an extensive presence and they have continued to try and grow that presence,” Smyth said.

Terror cells

A June 2019 report by the British newspaper The Telegraph said that Iranians were setting up terror cells in Africa under Soleimani’s direction. The paper reported that Iranian cells may be active in Sudan, Chad, Ghana, Niger, The Gambia and the Central African Republic.

However, Ryan Cummings, director of Signal Risk, an Africa-focused political and security risk management consultancy, said there is no evidence to date that Shia groups in Africa pose a threat to the U.S. or the West.

“Groups which have a distinct Shia theology — and which would place them in the orbit of Iran — have demonstrated no intent to carry out acts of violence against U.S./Western interests on the continent despite suggestions that they have embedded in these countries for several years,” he told VOA in a written statement.

Profit motives

Much of Iran’s engagement on the continent is less ideological and more profit-driven. One favored outlet has been weapons smuggling. A 2013 Conflict Armament Research report found Iranian bullets in 14 locations across nine African countries. At the time, the group said Sudan was partnering with Iran to funnel the ammunition to African armed groups.

“There’s actually a whole issue over the past couple of years of Iranian ammunition winding up throughout Africa,” Smyth said. “I mean from east to west. And it was rather interesting how these weapons systems and also the ammunition was arriving there.”

Smyth added that, in some cases, weapons are sent to Somalia, packed in wooden ships known as dhows and then smuggled across the Red Sea to Houthi fighters in Yemen.

Iran has also sought to exert influence on the African continent through religion. One prominent example of this is the Shia sect the Islamic Movement in Nigeria and its controversial leader Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. The group has been charged with inciting violence and El-Zakzaky has been imprisoned and formally accused by the Nigerian government of trying to form an “Islamic State in Nigeria” with the backing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

READ ALSO: Christian communities panic as Boko Haram increases attacks in Borno

Although Africa does not appear to be a focal point of the emerging conflict between Iran and the U.S., that could change. Smyth noted that al-Qaida linked groups historically sought to attack U.S. interests in Africa, viewing it as a more favorable operating environment for terror groups. This occurred in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and a 2002 attack against an Israeli-owned hotel and a failed attempt to shoot down a passenger jet taking off from Mombassa, Kenya.

“People will look at the continent and say, ‘Can we smuggle weapons in, are there populations there that we can target, do they have lower security, how is the connection that goes back to, let’s say, the Israeli, or back to the Americans,’“ Smyth said.

He added that Iran will not want to damage its own trade and diplomatic relations in Africa but it will look for ways to make a loud and, possibly violent, statement.

“They don’t want to harm their other interests in the continent. However, I believe, if push came to shove, and if they really thought it would be a good place to get their revenge, they may actually pick the continent to do it on,” he said.

Source: Salem Solomon | VOA News

The Biafra Times

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Publisher: Charles Opanwa

West Africa: The Risk of Jihadist Contagion in West Africa

December 23, 2019 | The Biafra Times

By International Crisis Group

Faced with jihadist breakthrough in Burkina Faso, neighbouring states in West Africa's Gulf of Guinea increasingly fear attacks in their own territories. These countries should improve intelligence sharing, strengthen border controls and regain the trust of local populations.

What's new? Islamist militants' lengthening reach in the Sahel, particularly in Burkina Faso, is a growing concern for coastal West African states. These states' leaders fear that militants could use Burkina as a launching pad for operations further south.

Why does it matter? Militant attacks could threaten coastal states' stability. Some of these states have weak spots similar to those that jihadists have exploited in the Sahel, notably neglected peripheries that resent central authority. Several will hold what promise to be contentious elections in 2020, distracting leaders from tackling the threat.

What should be done? The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is lobbying for joint military operations involving regional states. But intelligence sharing, border controls and efforts to win over local populations would be cheaper and more effective. ECOWAS should redouble efforts to avert electoral crises that militants could use to their advantage.



I. Overview

In West Africa, jihadist movements are spreading like the desert, from north to south. Their influence in Burkina Faso is a growing concern for West Africa's coastal states. Though these states have suffered very few attacks, their leaders fear that militants will use Burkina as a launching pad for operations further south. The subregional organisation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is lobbying for large-scale military operations in response.

Yet such operations could prove a blunt instrument in a situation that requires surgical tools; they may aggravate tensions among ethnic groups in vulnerable areas. Instead, coastal states should adopt measures that are less expensive and likely to be more effective: better intelligence gathering and sharing, better border controls, targeted arrests and repaired relations with populations in neglected northern areas. ECOWAS should also take steps to minimise risks that elections in several coastal states do not provoke crises that would distract from efforts to rein in jihadists.



The spectre of jihadism reaching toward the Gulf of Guinea haunts West Africa. Islamist militancy's growth in an increasing unstable Burkina Faso has greatly heightened this concern. Burkina occupies a critical position, linking the Sahel to coastal states and bordering four of them: Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo. Burkina's history, society, economy and politics are interwoven with those of its southern neighbours. It could serve as an open door to the Gulf of Guinea. With militants sinking roots in Burkina, they would occupy an ideal position for moving south.

Jihadists themselves have repeatedly affirmed their intention to expand into coastal West Africa. True, their ability to do so in the immediate future is unclear: they have yet to carry out attacks in any coastal country's north and, in the south, they have struck only one, Côte d'Ivoire in March 2016. But militants often act more out of opportunism, exploiting turmoil, than sophisticated strategy. They could draw strength from coastal states' own fragility.

In that light, the weaknesses Gulf of Guinea countries display, which often mirror those of their northern neighbours, are all the more troubling. Though richer than the Sahelian states, they are plagued by the same underdevelopment of peripheries remote from the seat of power, popular disenchantment with absent or brutal state authorities, and shortcomings in intelligence and security services. Several Gulf of Guinea countries will hold what appear set to be contentious elections in 2020, meaning the threat of violent political infighting looms. Presidential polls in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Togo could be particularly polarising and dangerous.

Another reason for the region's fragility lies in states' inability to work together. They have struggled to develop a united response to the jihadist threat. The creation of several different structures with overlapping security and development mandates has meant that efforts have been scattershot. ECOWAS is now attempting to coordinate, impose some order and mount joint military operations among its member states. But the subregional group lacks leadership and the billion dollars that joint operations require and that ECOWAS hopes will be supplied by West African states themselves appears unlikely to materialise, given the economic difficulties those states face.

There is a better and less costly option. Instead of stepping up military operations, coastal states should focus on sharing intelligence and strengthening border controls. They should make extra effort to regain the trust of local populations to slow down jihadist infiltration in their northern regions. Given the nature of the threat today, authorities in the region should focus on targeted missions based on reliable information, rather than large-scale operations that may result in the mistreatment of civilians, particularly among populations that are accused of being close to jihadists. Critical, too, is that ECOWAS and its foreign partners, notably the EU and France, step up diplomatic efforts to avert brewing electoral crises that could turn violent, threaten those countries' stability as much as jihadists do and create opportunities militants might exploit.

II. The Burkinabé Door

The Sahelian crisis has spread to Burkina Faso. Some jihadist groups appeared in northern Mali in 2012, and quickly spread to central Mali and the border between Mali and Niger. Since summer 2015, hundreds of attacks by jihadist and other armed groups, including self-defence militias, have occurred in Burkina Faso.

The spread of the Sahelian crisis into Burkina Faso may lead to violence on a regional scale, as it aids the progress of armed groups toward the coastal south. Geographically, Burkina Faso occupies a central position in West Africa. Sharing borders with Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin and Togo, the country sits at the junction of the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. Its relationship with its four southern neighbours is steeped in history, demography, economics and politics. Burkina and the coastal countries also have religious ties: as in many coastal states, a significant proportion of Burkinabé are Christian or animist, something unique in the Sahel, where the overwhelming majority of the population professes the Muslim faith. Burkina Faso therefore serves as an open door to the Gulf of Guinea.

By establishing themselves in Burkina Faso, jihadist groups can acquire a perfect launching pad for operations in the coastal south; they can benefit from the support of dense and longstanding community, religious, road, trade and criminal networks. For instance, Burkina Faso's numerous artisanal gold mines are a potential source of funding for armed jihadist groups. These mines' profitability is connected to coastal countries, because most of the gold is traded there. And from the supply sheds of these countries' artisanal and industrial gold mines, jihadist groups can obtain detonators for their home-made bombs.

Since the beginning of 2019, most incidents occurring at the borders of coastal countries, and involving jihadist armed groups either directly or indirectly, have been linked to Burkina Faso. Two French tourists kidnapped in Benin on 1 May, likely by bandits who allegedly tried to sell them to jihadist groups, were freed a few days later in northern Burkina Faso. In late April, Togo's President Faure Gnassingbé announced the arrest of suspected members of armed groups coming from the country's neighbour to the north. That same month, Burkinabé intelligence services warned their colleagues in neighbouring states that several armed jihadists had left the country to take refuge in Benin and Ghana. A few days later, Benin launched the Djidjoho military operation on its border with Burkina Faso. Koury, a Malian town near the border with Burkina Faso, where unidentified individuals attacked a border checkpoint and killed seven people on 19 May, is an important crossing point on the way to the country's second-largest city, Bobo-Dioulasso.

Burkina Faso is not the only possible entry point for groups seeking to extend their influence into West Africa. Several incidents have occurred on the border between Mali and Côte d'Ivoire, including the abduction of a Colombian nun in the Sikasso region in February 2017. In recent months, the jihadist group Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) appears to be trying to open a corridor from northern Mali to north-western Nigeria and northern Benin, passing through the Nigerian town of Dogondoutchi. For its part, the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), an offshoot of Boko Haram, is hoping to benefit from the chaos caused by an unprecedented crime wave in the Nigerian state of Zamfara, on the border with Niger, to sell weapons and help its members gain access to south-western Niger.

At present, jihadist groups seem to be advancing toward the south and east of Burkina Faso, approaching the Gulf of Guinea states. On 7 November 2019, an attack on a convoy of workers from the Boungou gold mine, which killed at least 38 people, confirmed their presence in the east of the country, bordering Benin and Togo. This attack occurred in spite of the Otapuanu military operation, which was launched on 7 March 2019 and which authorities had hailed as a success. It has heightened the concerns of mining companies, showing that armed groups were active in an area close to their sites, particularly in northern Ghana. Bringing further legitimacy to these concerns, Burkinabé security forces recently intervened in the region of Pô, a town bordering Ghana in the south east of the country, killing six individuals suspected of terrorism.

Burkina Faso's stability does not depend solely on the security of regions like the north and east, where armed groups are present. In a country where popular insurrections have led the head of state to resign not once but twice, in 1966 and 2014, social tensions resulting from poor living conditions pose a real threat to the leadership elected in 2015. As well as contributing to the efficiency of Burkina Faso's security apparatus, the country's partners should help defuse public anger by financially supporting the government of President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, but also by facilitating dialogue between it and the opposition and civil society.

Partner countries, along with regional and international institutions, should also pay close attention to the political fragility of Burkina Faso. The presidential election scheduled for 2020 is crucial for the country, but there is no guarantee that it will pass off peacefully. For the first time in decades, there will be an open ballot with an uncertain outcome. The sense of unfettered competition is whetting politicians' appetites. In a country where jihadist and self-defence groups are both active, and civilian volunteers are engaged alongside the regular armed forces, any of the candidates could be tempted to use force against his opponents. Finally, for the first time in Burkina's history, the diaspora, which includes several million people living in nearby countries, will be able to vote. Emigrés could well determine the election result. Their votes must be accurately counted in order to avoid disputes. In other words, other coastal countries, notably Côte d'Ivoire, will also need to prepare for the Burkinabé election.

Burkina Faso cannot afford a new political crisis or period of transition like that which followed the departure of President Blaise Compaoré in 2014. The actors in this transition used the army for political ends, to advance or defend their own interests, diverting it from its main mission of territorial defence. A new phase of political instability marked by the absence of a strong, legitimate executive would produce similar results, further damaging the security forces' capacity to fight armed groups. As such, the wider the "Burkinabé door" opens, the greater the risk that the central Sahel's violence will become a broader regional phenomenon. The coming months are crucial for both the country and the region. Under pressure from both jihadists and an institutional crisis, the Burkinabé state would likely crumble, losing its ability to stop militant groups from spreading southward.

III. Jihadist Ambitions for Expansion in the Gulf of Guinea

For the past several years, armed groups active in the Sahel have referred in their declarations to the destabilisation of countries in the Gulf of Guinea. In a video dated 8 November 2018, three leaders of the Group to Support Islam and Muslims (GSIM) - Iyad Ag Ghali, Djamel Okacha and Amadou Koufa - a coalition of jihadist groups created in 2017 and affiliated with al-Qaeda, called on the Fulani people dispersed across the Sahel and West Africa to "pursue jihad" in other countries, notably citing Senegal, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Cameroon.

As yet, no al-Qaeda or ISIS figure has announced a detailed plan to destabilise Burkina Faso and turn it into jihadist corridor leading to coastal countries, although several incidents suggest collaboration between different jihadist armed groups on Burkinabé soil. In 2014 and 2015, unidentified combatants coming from Mali reportedly carried out reconnaissance operations in Benin and Burkina Faso, in the W National Park, not far from the Pendjari National Park where two French tourists were kidnapped and their Beninese guide killed last May. Arrested in April 2019 in Burkina Faso, Oumarou Diallo, the commander of a local jihadist group known as the Diawo Group, had a list of contacts in Benin, Togo and Ghana, demonstrating links with these countries. Several analysts interpret this collaboration as the sign of a joint project that seeks to bring about Burkina Faso's collapse so as to open a passage into Togo, Benin, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.

For these groups, there are many advantages to opening new southern fronts in the coastal countries' northern regions. As an extension of the Sahel, these border areas have practical benefits, serving as a rear base for rest and logistics. Crisis Group has received reports from several sources that armed militants from Burkina Faso are moving regularly along the Ghanaian and Togolese borders, on their way to "rest areas" in these countries.

As jihadist groups spread their attacks across a wider geographic area, they hinder the campaigns of regional and international forces by obliging them to disperse. The militants adopted this decentralisation strategy in 2013, when the French Operation Serval drove them out of towns they were occupying in Mali. They have since sought to take over rural areas abandoned by the state and weakened by local tensions, in particular along borders. The push toward the Gulf of Guinea seems to be a continuation of this trend toward dispersal of the enemy, while putting pressure on fragile border areas.

Finally, with a foothold in the coastal countries' northern areas, the region's jihadist groups could establish way stations allowing them to get closer to prime targets in the major coastal cities. Another feat like the March 2016 attack on the Ivorian seaside town of Grand-Bassam would heighten the unrest that the jihadists crave; it would also effectively punish countries like Togo and Côte d'Ivoire for their participation in the UN's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Ivorian authorities, with the help of French intelligence services, reportedly thwarted several attacks in Abidjan last May. Obtaining this foothold would allow jihadist groups to extend the corridor stretching from northern Mali to north-western Nigeria and northern Benin.

IV. The Shared Weaknesses of the Central Sahel and Gulf of Guinea

It is difficult to predict which Gulf of Guinea countries are most likely to be infected by the jihadist contagion in the months or years to come. This vast area includes not only Burkina Faso's immediate neighbours, but also Guinea, which for the moment seems impervious to jihadist attacks, and even Senegal, which has strengthened security at its borders in recent years, notably to avoid an attack in its capital, Dakar.

With the exception of Côte d'Ivoire, events in the northern regions of the coastal countries bordering Burkina Faso are little known. The north of Benin, Togo and Ghana has, until recently, remained on the periphery of researchers' concerns, at least from a security perspective. This area was spared the major West African crises of recent decades, including the Mano River wars and the first years of the Sahelian crisis.

In addition, there is no obvious shared weakness that armed groups could exploit. These countries' northern regions are made up of territories that are highly heterogeneous in terms of demography, politics and economics. In this area, stretching for hundreds of kilometres, local dynamics will determine where communal tensions and frustrations will continue to simmer, and where they will boil over into violent movements, led either by jihadists or other armed groups. Similarly, each country's religious realities are complex. It is too simplistic to view the coastal countries as structured around a Muslim north and a Christian south. Such a picture takes no account of the mass migration from north to south, the high incidence of mixed marriage - which has increased with urbanisation - or the large numbers of animists.

A trend has been emerging in recent years, however: the gap is widening between these northern areas and the central state, while the southern coastline attracts the bulk of investment contributing to economic development and modernisation.

Ghana provides a clear example. Here, roughly one quarter of the population lives below the poverty line. Yet 70 per cent of people in the north are afflicted by poverty, despite the Ghanaian state's efforts in the 2000s, notably to provide health care and other infrastructure in Tamélé and its surroundings. According to the World Bank, the situation is similar in Côte d'Ivoire, where "the northern and north-western regions of the country have higher poverty rates (over 60 per cent) than coastal areas and the south-western region (under 40 per cent)".

READ ALSO: Nigeria: The New War Against Africa’s Christians

Alarmingly, countries in the Gulf of Guinea have neglected outlying zones in proximity to the turbulent Sahel. In the central Sahel, this lack of state control is a major cause of the increased violence in certain peripheries. Similar to what is happening across the border in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, many people in northern parts of the Gulf of Guinea countries are also facing difficulties with access to natural resources, leading to clashes between farmers and herders, which have contributed heavily to the escalation in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso.

Political solutions are urgently needed to lower the risk of armed conflict in the coastal countries' remote northern regions. Governments in the Gulf of Guinea should no longer link public spending to the electoral strategy of investing mainly in areas with the most voters or which support the ruling party. International partners must ditch the development dogma of placing infrastructure in the most densely populated areas as a way of maximising the return on investment.

Gauging the jihadist threat is by no means straightforward. Within the space of a few months, countries in the Gulf of Guinea and their partners have shifted from a sense of unease to a state of alert. A French army reconnaissance mission in northern Benin indicated some concern already in April 2019. In July, the French army's chief of the defence staff, François Lecointre, replied to the question, "is there a risk that the jihadist movement could pose a threat to neighbouring West Africa?" by saying, "we're not there yet". Just a few months later, in late November, he remarked that the French army was seeking to "prevent this [jihadist] hydra from continuing to expand into other West African countries". The spiralling violence in Burkina Faso has been instrumental in spreading this perception of insecurity.

The proceeds that various West and Central African countries derive from counter-terrorist activities have encouraged some of them to overstate a threat whose actual extent is sometimes debatable. No armed jihadist group has yet attacked the north of a country in the Gulf of Guinea. Jihadists have been blamed for many attacks on these countries' borders, yet none have claimed responsibility themselves.

A high-profile example was the killing of a Spanish priest and four Burkinabé customs officials on 15 February 2019 near Burkina Faso's border with Togo. The abduction of two French citizens in W National Park in Benin, in May 2019, was allegedly carried out by bandits who then tried to sell them to the ISGS or to Katiba Macina, a militant group based in central Mali. Although the jihadist forces' involvement seems indirect, this incident has still stoked fears in West African countries and among their partners, reinforcing the idea that the regional security apparatus in place at the time of these events was not fit for purpose and needs rethinking.

V. The Elusive Regional Response

Since it fails to include all West African nations, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad) appears to be an inadequate response to the regional contagion of jihadist violence. The G5 Sahel is based on the idea that the jihadist threat would expand horizontally, crossing the western Sahel from east to west; the force's designers ignored the possibility of vertical expansion, despite warnings from many quarters. As early as 2017, an ECOWAS senior official expressed concerns about deficiencies in the G5 Sahel's security measures, predicting attacks on coastal countries, particularly Benin.

The G5 and other West African countries have never properly joined forces. Detractors point to how the G5 artificially divides West Africa into two distinct spaces, ignoring the human and political ties between the northern and southern countries. The labelling of a Sahel region limited to four Francophone countries and Mauritania has also caused rifts in the region, reigniting old rivalries between Francophones and Anglophones, and rousing suspicions of French neo-colonial ambitions. Ivorian president Alassane Ouattara, patriarch of West Africa and undoubtedly France's most loyal ally in the region, highlighted the G5 Sahel's limitations last June: "MINUSMA and the G5 Sahel aren't enough on their own. We must find ways to coordinate more broadly and more effectively in order to help these neighbouring countries combat terrorism".

Over the coming months, ECOWAS will assess the possibility of greater coordination. During the extraordinary session of the summit for heads of state and government held in Ouagadougou on 14 September, the sub-regional organisation adopted an action plan to coordinate and improve the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts, and committed itself, along with its member states, to raising $1 million between 2020 and 2024.

This task is divided among various organisations, and three in particular: the G5; the multinational force comprising Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger in the fight against Boko Haram; and the Accra Initiative, a cooperative venture of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo that targets organised crime and "violent extremism" in the border regions of member countries.

ECOWAS is the best-placed organisation to coordinate efforts to combat jihadist violence across the region, being the only forum where the leaders of its member states can regularly meet to reach agreements and seek common ground. Most countries in the region have a presidential system and their heads of state enjoy far-reaching powers, a crucial asset when it comes to decision-making.

Regrettably, like the G5, ECOWAS is hampered by a lack of vision, and no president of its member countries has been able to provide clear leadership. The organisation has trouble speaking with one voice on important peace and security issues. Its recent promise in Ouagadougou to coordinate counter-terrorism activities is likely to founder without stronger and broader regional cooperation on the ground, encompassing issues of collective security. As the regional economic and demographic powerhouse, Nigeria should be the country to play this role. It is enmeshed in domestic problems, however, and sometimes finds itself at loggerheads with ECOWAS. Nigeria should prioritise regaining its influence over the region and take the lead.

The most encouraging aspect of the action plan presented in Ouagadougou is the aim to self-finance counter-terrorism activities from 2020 to 2024. The G5 has shown how financial dependence can become paralysing. Its armed forces have been hindered by financial difficulties from the outset, a problem compounded by the group's lack of control over its own budget: its external funding depends on pledges, or else backers manage its resources instead of the member states themselves.

But the million-dollar budget announced by ECOWAS will be hard to raise in its entirety. In common with many regional organisations, ECOWAS needs to reconcile its international mission with powerful national interests. It also finds itself in a particularly tricky situation: more than one third of its members are preparing for presidential elections in 2020. The organisation will face obstacles in mobilising the funds earmarked in Ouagadougou, since these countries will focus on their electoral processes or even prioritise the re-election of incumbent heads of state. Another challenge for ECOWAS is the insolvency of some of its members, such as the Sahel countries that lack the funds to pay for the G5 from their own budgets. The wealthiest contributor, Nigeria, is already contributing 70 per cent of the organisation's budget, and it can hardly be asked to give more.

For a group of poor and indebted countries, the advantage of spending such large sums on counter-terrorism initiatives is also arguable. Experience shows that money offers no guaranteed results. Nigeria spent $2 billion on defence in 2018, yet it has been unable to overpower Boko Haram, a terrorist group with only a few thousand fighters. The country has even been forced to call on Chad, whose defence spending ran to $233 million in 2018, for help.

The region must find smarter, more effective ways of containing the jihadist threat: greater coordination; better intelligence gathering and sharing; and more effective border controls, which will require tackling the corruption that is rife in many customs services and police forces. ECOWAS must use the money to fill the gaps rather than spend it on expensive military operations that have yet to deliver on their promises. Three large-scale operations in May and November 2018 formed part of the Accra Initiative. Although it is difficult to be certain of the actual level of involvement of the hundreds of people arrested, the over-representation of the Peul among them raises questions. Giving into stigmatisation of particular ethnic groups would spur jihadist recruitment among those groups - as already seen in the Sahel.

Countries in the region should avoid unrealistic quick fixes and instead implement counter-terrorism plans based on budgets that can be rolled over for the long term. Experts agree that combating active jihadist movements in West Africa requires a lengthy commitment.

The Ouagadougou summit has not dispelled doubts about ECOWAS's ability to collaborate more effectively with neighbouring regions, particularly North and Central Africa. Meanwhile, the crises in the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin have revealed the geographic spread of armed groups' activities. Member states in different regional groupings therefore need to come up with coordinated responses. In this sense, the same criticism that the G5 is too geographically limited to be effective in combating terrorism could also be levelled at ECOWAS. Jihadism transcends the borders of West Africa and affects other countries such as Chad.

ECOWAS has not yet said how it plans to coordinate its Ouagadougou roadmap with European initiatives on security and development in the Sahel. One question, for example, is how it will accommodate the new Partnership for Security and Stability for the Sahel, or P3S, announced in Biarritz in August 2019 by France and Germany. For the time being, P3S does not include ECOWAS as such - the first point of the communiqué announcing its existence does not mention the West African association, whereas it does refer to the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. But it might eventually welcome ECOWAS members. Like ECOWAS, the yet-to-be-finalised P3S seeks to improve coordination of security and development projects in the region, particularly those led by European partners.

More significantly, the ECOWAS summit in Ouagadougou focused on combating jihadist violence as opposed to dealing with political issues. In so doing, this high-level meeting perpetuated a simplistic reading of the violence over the past six years in the Sahel: one positing that the violence stems solely from terrorist acts, rather than other roots, such as rural insurgencies. To make any real difference, ECOWAS must be more politically engaged and less fixated on security issues. It could start by drawing a distinction between actions labelled as "terrorism"-related, such as the Grand-Bassam attacks in 2016, and rebellions in rural parts of the Sahel. If ECOWAS continues to be locked into a security paradigm, referring to all violence as terrorism, it risks overlooking the eminently political dimension of a crisis that can translate into outright rejection of governments and raise questions about states' ability to control conflicts over access to natural resources.

VI. The Threat of Political Crises

ECOWAS must play a broader political role to ward off another threat looming over the region: the risk of conflict connected to electoral processes. In various coastal countries with elections scheduled for next year, political actors are working "to rekindle polarisation, stirring up tensions and violence". In the near future, many member countries could find themselves severely weakened by these political tensions. The emphasis on security and terrorism must not overshadow the fact that political crises are often as deadly as clashes with armed groups. They also tend to weaken the armed forces by dividing them along party or ethnic lines. Political conflicts undo years of investment in training and force governments to use the security apparatus to monitor and punish their rivals. All these factors weaken their ability to tackle well-trained and well-prepared armed groups.

Tensions have been running high for the past several months in Benin, for example, after the executive branch moved to limit participation in the April 2019 legislative elections to two groups that support the president, Patrice Talon. Violence has broken out in various areas, leading to at least seven deaths in the capital Cotonou in May. The political dialogue announced by President Talon on 10 October is a pointless exercise because it excludes serious opposition. In neighbouring Togo, a political crisis pitting a fragmented opposition against a dynastic ruling party remains unresolved after four decades, and a presidential election is also coming up next year.

Côte d'Ivoire is likewise faced with several obstacles less than a year ahead of its presidential election scheduled for October 2020. No consensus has been reached on the electoral framework, with the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire, refusing to sit on the independent electoral commission. The disagreements between participants about the rules of the game augur a tense election whose result could be contested. The unease could even trigger violent protests and a pre-electoral crisis. Aggravating the situation still further, a few months ago the government launched a campaign of intimidation on the opposition, targeting high-profile figures, jeopardising the possibility of dialogue and fuelling resentment.

In Guinea, President Alpha Condé plans to run for a third term in 2020. His desire to amend the constitution accordingly has already sparked major protests, causing several deaths in October and November 2019. His determination to cling to power could eventually lead to ethnic conflicts between his group, the Malinké, and the country's predominant Peul population, who are the majority in the opposition parties.

In certain countries of the Gulf of Guinea, the commitment to engage in counter-terrorism initiatives is sometimes unclear. Governments have occasionally diverted funds intended for security operations to monitor or repress the opposition instead of dealing with the threat of armed groups. Similarly, some leaders have realised that trumpeting counter-terrorism initiatives brings rewards from their backers, in the form of either extra funding or greater tolerance for authoritarian rule.

The risk lies in the combustible mix of the spreading jihadist threat to the countries in the Gulf of Guinea and the onset of violent political clashes in the cities to the south of these countries. If such disturbances erupt in one or more coastal countries, security forces could deploy in the south, increasing the distance between capitals and northern territories, and opening the way for jihadist groups to move in. ECOWAS, with the support of experienced partners, particularly the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, should move as quickly as possible to contain the spread of political crises.

The regional organisation must condemn the attacks on fundamental rights occurring in some member states, such as the expulsion and intimidation of opposition members and the violent repression of protests. It should also remind its member countries about shared rules on electoral laws and independence of electoral bodies. In accordance with the protocol on democracy and good governance adopted by ECOWAS members on 21 December 2001, these governments should refrain from making "substantial modification [... ] to the electoral laws in the last six months before the elections" and ensure that the "bodies responsible for organizing the elections [are] independent or neutral and ... have the confidence of all the political actors".

VII. Conclusion

In 2020, for the first time in its post-independence history, West Africa could face a major crisis coupling political disturbances in the south with insecurity in the north. The combination of these two flashpoints could be catastrophic for the region. To avert this possibility, awareness of the danger must be raised at the highest possible level. Leaders need to recognise that terrorism is not the only threat in the area, and that regional interests must take precedence over private and national considerations. Otherwise, various heads of state will soon find themselves the leaders of countries in turmoil.

The Biafra Times

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Publisher: Charles Opanwa

Nigeria truly the troubled giant of Africa says Campbell

John Campbell - Former US Ambassador to Nigeria

 October 8, 2018 | The Biafra Times

A former US Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. John Campbell, has said though Nigeria possesses extraordinary potential, it is the truly troubled giant of Africa.

Campbell stated this in a new book he co-authored which was presented to the public on Thursday in Lagos at the US Consul General’s residence.

He also saluted the entrepreneurial spirit of Nigerians in the book titled, “Nigeria: What Everyone Needs to Know”

Campbell stated in the book that virtually every major university in the English-speaking world hosted Nigerian academics with the country’s medical personnel found in hospitals all over the United States and elsewhere.

He said, “Though it possesses extraordinary potential, Nigeria is truly the troubled giant of Africa. And Nigeria exports Christian clergy to the United Kingdom and the United States. Nigerians living outside of Nigeria have been notably successful in business and finance, and they are known for their entrepreneurial spirit.’’

READ ALSO: Biafra: Fulani dominated Nigeria security apparatus in Biafra land, a tool of intimidation in furtherance of their jihadi agenda

In the book, Campbell and Matthew T. Page, Associate Fellow in Chatham House’s Africa Programme,  described Nigeria as a nation characterised by a type of corruption in which government or public officials seek personal gain at the expense of the led.

They stated, “Kleptocracy and government dishonesty have corrosive effects on popular confidence in governance. Official and unofficial corruption undermine the democratic trajectory and risks overwhelming it. It is among the most important hindrances to the country’s economic and social development.

“Despite ubiquitous cell phone use and other signs of modernity, the country is one of the poorest in the world. By indices ranging from levels of female literacy to average lifespan, Nigeria scores among the lowest in the world. The country’s population has grown explosively without the economic and infrastructure development necessary to support it."

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IPOB: How Biafra Government system will be

Published on | The Biafra Times 

January 14, 2019

THIS IS FOR THOSE OF US WHO DO NOT KNOW HOW BIAFRA SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WILL BE LIKE:
During the interactive session with our leader, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, on 12th January, 2019, OWEI KEME BRADIKUMO asked a question:

1) What is the proposed CONSTITUTION of the upcoming UNITED STATES of BIAFRA. Can we get a draft copy of it in the public domain now that will be necessary before our campaign towards the pending globally accepted BIAFRA REFERENDUM?

Response from MAZI NNAMDI KANU:
Biafra will run a unique political system designed to carter for the needs of our people.

We are going to have NATION STATES. We will have an IGBO NATION WITHIN BIAFRA. We will have an EFIK NATION WITHIN BIAFRA. We will have ANNANG NATION WITHIN BIAFRA, if they so choose. We will also have IJAW NATION WITHIN BIAFRA. We will have ISOKO NATION WITHIN BIAFRA. We will have IDOMA NATION WITHIN BIAFRA. We will have IGALA NATION WITHIN BIAFRA. Listen to this: THEY WILL ALL BE AUTONOMOUS. Each Nation State will control the resources in their own land. The only thing that will bind us together will be a COMMON DEFENSE POLICY, COMMON ECONOMIC POLICY, COMMON POLICY IN HEALTH AND EDUCATION. In the rest, let people develop according to the pace that they wish or they decided amongst themselves to go by.

LAWS WILL BE DONE IN LOCAL LANGUAGES. Igbo Parliament will make their own laws in Igbo language. Ijaw Parliament will make their own laws in Ijaw language. The same thing applies to Ibibio and others. So that when people are lying to us we will know because you know lying is good in English Language. But you can't deceive the people when you are actually speaking in the language that they understand.

What we are going to have in Biafra will be A BRAND NEW NATION WITH NEW IDEAS AND NEW WAYS OF DOING THINGS. Our political arrangements will be geared towards addressing our core needs.

Igbo Land will have a Prime Minister. The same thing will happen to Ijaw, to Isoko, to Urhobo, to Itshekiri. Everybody will be Autonomous from one another to develop at the pace that they like. That is the type of Biafra we are seeking to have. And that is the type of Biafra we are going to have.

COMRADE EMMA POWERFUL MEDIA AND PUBLICITY SECRETARY FOR IPOB.

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